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tions of an internationally-agreed-uponregime. The authorsconclude that the United States is wrong as a matter of law in
asserting that seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas and is
unwise as a matter ofpolicy in thinking that UnitedStates corporationscould profitably mine the polymetallic nodules of the deep
seabed outside of an internationallyrecognizedseabed authority.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

If you start with the premise that the United States has a paramount
right, as a freedom of the high seas, to engage in seabed mining... then
anything that is done by way of subjecting American companies to regulation by an international body is by definition a concession. But you can
start from a very different point of departure, and that is to recognize that
nobody even thought about getting at the resources of the deep seabed
until a decade or so ago, and that immediately raised the question of
whose resources are these.
As soon as that question was raised, they were declared to be the common
heritage of mankind, and 130-some countries took that to mean that the
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resources belong to the world and that nobody therefore has any right of
access to them until and unless they gain that right of access pursuant to
an international agreement and under a body thereby established. If you
look at it in this way then the question of the terms and conditions of access and so on seem to take on quite a different coloration.
-Elliot
Richardson, then the
United States Ambassador to the
Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, in 19791
U.S. citizens are to pay all of these millions of dollars to an international
organization for rights they presently enjoy at no cost under the well-recognized International Law Doctrine of the Freedom of the High Seas.
-Senator Russell Long, criticizing
the seabed provisions of the negotiating texts produced at the
Conference, 1979.2

In August 1980, Elliot Richardson, the United States Ambassador to the protracted Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS E[[),3 told the Conference that "the substance of a new comprehensive Treaty, in very close to final form,
is at hand."4 The negotiations, he predicted, would be completed
in 1981.5

The Reagan administration has, however, altered this timetable.

One of the first foreign-policy actions taken by the new administration in early 1981 was to tell the delegates that the United
States would not participate in further negotiations until it could
1. Quoted in The Status of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea: HearingBefore the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
59 (1979). Richardson resigned as Ambassador after the resumed Ninth session of
the Conference, in October, 1980.
2. 125 CONG. REc. S18510 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Long).
3. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has been in
progress since 1974. The negotiations cover the entire spectrum of ocean issues,
but the deep seabed issue has been the most difficult. For descriptions of the progress of the negotiations, see generally Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparationsfor
the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 A3. J. INT'L I 1 (1974); Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 Arm. J.
INT' L 1 (1975); Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. IN'LV L. 763 (1975); Oxman, The Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Session, 71
Az 3. INV'L I 247 (1977); Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 Am. 3. INr'L L 57 (1978); Oxman, The
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Seventh Session
(1978), 73 Am. J. IN'L I 1 (1979); Oxman, The Third UnitedNations Conference on
the Law of the Sea; The Eighth Session (1979), 74 Am 3. IN'L L. 1 (1980).
4. Plenary Statement by Ambassador Richardson, August 26, 1980 to the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in DEP'T STATE MEMO ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA (Sept. 19, 1980).
5. Id.

thoroughly review the Draft Convention. 6 The proposed regime
governing the mining of polymetallic nodules7 in the deep seabed
was apparently the main cause for this reappraisal.
Some representatives of the private seabed mining consortia
have been vocal in their opposition to the proposed treaty, although they do not speak with a single voice. In reference to a
previous negotiating text, Marne A. Dubs, Director of Ocean Resources for Kennecott Copper and spokesperson on seabed mining for the American Mining Congress, wrote: "If the present
negotiating text is not substantially changed... and it instead
enters into force in anything like its present form, there will be no
U.S. ocean mining industry."8 On the other hand, Paul Peters, a
member of a different seabed mining group, said after the announcement of the Reagan reappraisal that the current negotiat6. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/W.P. 10/Rev. 3 (1980). This document, though
still technically a negotiating text had received the general support of the United

States delegation. See text at note 4 supra.
The most recent text, like previous drafts, creates an International Seabed Authority (ISA). All entities wishing to mine the seabed must receive permits from
the ISA. Developed nations and private companies must submit two mine sites to
the ISA; the ISA grants them one and reserves the other for the use of its mining
arm, the Enterprise, or for developing countries.
The Reagan administration has replaced the key individuals in the old negotiating team. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1981, at 1, coL 1. The dismissal of the negotiators,
called a "second Saturday night massacre" by Richardson, could indicate the present administration's deep dissatisfaction with the present negotiating text. Deputy Secretary of State William Clark said the administration wanted a "clean
break" with the past. Id.
7. The polymetallic nodules (also frequently called manganese nodules) are
dark, potato-shaped rocks that occur on the floor of the world's oceans. They vary
in their mineral content, but are chiefly valuable for nickel; copper, manganese,
and cobalt are of secondary importance. Although nodules occur almost everywhere in the deep oceans, deposits of sufficient quality to warrant commercial exploitation in the foreseeable future exist primarily in a narrow band stretching
from Baja California to about 1000 miles south of Hawaii, a region called the Clarion and Clipperton Fracture Zones. See flI J. FRAZER & M. Fmc, AvAmAL M=r OF
COPPER, NICKEL, COBALT AND MANGANESE FROM OCEAN FERROMANGANESE NODuLES (1980); Frazer, Manganese Nodule Reserves: An Updated Estimate, 1 MARmNE

Mu=G 103 (1977). For general discussions of polymetallic nodule deposits and
seabed mining, see G. GLASBY, MARINE MANGANESE DEPOSITS (1977); J. MERO, THE
MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA

(1965).

Deepsea mining for polymetallic nodules is a technologically sophisticated process. To date, prototype equipment has been tested but equipment capable of sustained commercial recovery has not been built. Five major consortia-four
multinational, one French-have been formed to develop seabed mining technology and processing methods and to explore for nodule deposits. Since the mid1960s, they have spent about $200 million; a full-scale commercial project will cost
about $1 billion. See ARTHUR D. LrrLE, INc., TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC AsSESSMENT OF MANGANESE NODULE IINING AND PROCESSING (1979).
8. Letter from Marne A. Dubs to Elliot Richardson (Feb. 29, 1980), reprinted
in The Status of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Spring 1980: HearingBefore the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 77 (1980).
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ing text "is probably the best that can be achieved." 9
When Ambassador James L. Malone, current head of the United
States delegation, testified before Congress to explain the new administration's reasons for delaying the negotiations, he focused
exclusively on the deep seabed mining provisions of the proposed
treaty.1O He complained about the "burdensome international
regulation" that would restrain private prospecting for the
polymetallic nodules;'" the creation of "a supranational mining
company, called the Enterprise, which would benefit from significant discriminatory advantages relative to the companies of industrialized countries;"' 2 the mandatory transfer of technology
"now largely in U.S. hands" to the Enterprise and private mining
companies in developing countries;' 3 the production limitations;' 4
the governing structure of the International Seabed Authority's
Assembly and Council;15 the revenue-sharing provisions; 6 and
other provisions that limit the freedom of action of the private
consortia from the developed world.
The principal issue that underlies the current "reappraisal"
over whether the United States should eventually ratify this
treaty is the question whether it is lawful for a nation to mine the
polymetallic nodules without treating the resource as part of the
"common heritage" of humankind, without adhering to international standards, and without sharing the profits with the rest of
the world. The United States gave significant support to the common heritage idea during the Nixon administration, 7 but, during
the last few years, our spokespersons have declared that the exploitation of deep seabed resources is a freedom of the high seas
under current law.' 8 As Ambassador Richardson noted, however,
9. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1981, at D15, coL 2 (remarks of Paul Peters, International Law Administrator, Royal Dutch/Shell.)
10. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marines & Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 634 (1981) (statement of
James L. Malone). Compare these comments with earlier U.S. statements note
150 infra.
11. Id. at 636.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 637; see notes 159-80 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 132-33, 147-48 and accompanying text infra.
18. See, e.g., Hearing Before the House Subcomm on Oceanography of the
House Comm on MerchantMarine and Fisheries,93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 50 (1974)
(statement of Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Adviser, United States Department

only a few other countries share this opinion: "We insist that
there is a right under international law to engage in seabed mining as a high seas freedom, but there are only a dozen or 15 countries that take that position .... ,19 Opposing the United States
are at least 130 nations, including the 119 developing nations rep1978, the
resented by the Group of 77, China, and, at least since
20
Soviet Union and the other Eastern European nations.
of State) [hereinafter cited as Brower statement]: "At the present time, under international law and the High Seas Convention, it is open to anyone who has the
capacity to engage in mining of the deep seabed subject to the proper exercise of
the high seas rights of the countries involved"; Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553, 30 U.S.C. § 1401-1605 [hereinafter cited
as Deep Seabed Act]. "[I]t is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are
freedoms of the high seas. . . ." Id. § 2(a) (12), 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (a) (12).
19. Briefing on the 8th Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on InternationalPolicy and Trade
and the Subcomm. on InternationalOrganizationsof the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1979).
20. Most developing countries have argued since the late 1960s that seabed
mining prior to a comprehensive international regime is unlawful. A United Nations General Assembly resolution, the "Moratorium Resolution," G.A. Res. 2574,
24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 10, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969), declared such mining
unlawful. The Resolution passed by a vote of 62-28, with 28 abstentions. Almost
all of the developed nations, including the United States and the socialist nations,
voted against the Resolution. The United States and other developed nations denied any legally binding effect of the Resolution. 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 831
(1970) (statement of John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, United States Department
of State.)
The developing nations have picked up support since the late 1960s. The Soviet
Union now argues that unilateral exploitation prior to a treaty is "illegal." U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/SR. 109 at 30 (1978) (statement of USSR representative). At the
same time, statements supporting the position of the Group of 77 were made by
representatives of China, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Australia. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/BUR/
SR. 41. The most recent expression of international views on interim seabed mining is contained in Resolution 108(V) ("Exploitation of the Resources of the SeaBed"), adopted by the Trade and Development Board of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/79 (1979).
This resolution:
1. Reiterates that any unilateral action in contravention of the pertinent resolutions [referring to the 1970 Declaration of Principles and a 1978
UNCTAD resolution calling upon all nations to refrain from exploiting the
seabed until an international regime is adopted] would not be recognized
by the international community and would be invalid according to international law;
2. Requests all States to refrain from adopting legislation or any other
measure designed to carry on the exploitation of the sea-bed and ocean
floor, and the subsoil thereof; beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
until an international regime is adopted by the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea;
3. Warns that States which might take such unilateral actions would
have to assume the responsibility for their consequences both with respect to their impact on the United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea and with regard to the negotiations on commodities related to the exploitation of mineral resources of the sea-bed.
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The United States position was formalized to some extent by
the passage in 1980 of the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources
Act,21 which establishes a system whereby a potential miner can
The resolution was adopted by a roll call vote of 107 to 9, with 13 abstentions. The
voting breakdown was as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Central African Empire, Chile, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic
Kampuchea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Yemen,
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar,
Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principo, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates,
United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam,
Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.
Against: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, United States of America.
Abstentions: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.
For a recent expression of the position of the Group of 77, see Letter from Chairman Anand of the Group of 77 (Aug. 23, 1979), reprintedin U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
89 (1979).
21. The Deep Seabed Act, supra note 18, § 2(b) (2), declares itself to be transitional, pending the entry into force of a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty. It
authorizes the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to issue licenses for exploration, and permits for commercial recovery of
the deep seabed resources to United States citizens or corporations and other entities controlled by United States citizens. Id. § 102(a). No commercial recovery is
permitted prior to January 1, 1988, a date sought by Ambassador Richardson to
minimize international friction while not slowing the timetables of private seabed
miners. United States citizens are forbidden to engage in seabed exploration or
exploitation unless they receive a license or permit. Id. § 101(a). The applicant
selects the area of the seabed it wants. This area must be granted to it unless the
area is not a "logical mining unit" or if mining would cause significant detriment to
the environment. Id. § 103(D). If competing applications are received for the
same area of the seabed, the Administrator shall decide between them using
"principles of equity," including the time when the applicant began exploring the
area in question, and the amounts it has expended. Id. § 101(b) (3). See also Deep
Seabed Mining (Proposed Regulations), 46 Fed. Reg. 18458 (1981). A license for
exploration entities the license-holder to a later permit for commercial exploitation on the site chosen. The Deep Seabed Act, supra note 18, § 102(b) (3).
The miner will obtain security of tenure on its granted site against other claimants through three kinds of protections. First, the United States will exercise its
jurisdiction over its own citizens to prevent them from interfering with the holder

receive interim permits to explore and exploit the seabed. This
legislation had been introduced repeatedly in the 1970's, and the
eventual support for it by Ambassador Richardson and the Carter
administration was intended both as a boost to the domestic seabed mining industry and as a prod to the law of the sea negotiations. The statute prohibits significant commercial exploitation of
the seabed until January 1, 1988, in order to give the United Nations negotiators a chance to complete their work.22 It does, however, permit the licensing of mine sites and substantial
preliminary investment and preparation prior to that time.23
The stage thus appears to be set for a major international confrontation on seabed mining, with the bulk of the debate centering on the current international law that governs the seabed. This
question has been reviewed widely in the legal literature,24 but
of a license or permit. Id. § 102(b) (2). Second, other nations can become "reciprocating states," by enacting similar legislation. Reciprocating states will receive
recognition of claims by their citizens from the United States in return for their
recognition and protection of American claims. See text at notes 237-64 infra.
Third, the Deep Seabed Act requires the Secretary of State to attempt to reconcile
conflicts with the citizens of other nations. The Deep Seabed Act, supra note 18,
§ 102(b) (4).
The permit holder, after beginning commercial recovery, must pay a proportion
of its revenue into an escrow fund which will be used for international revenue
sharing required by a future Law of the Sea Treaty. 30 U.S.C. § 1472(a) (1980). See
also notes 168-74 and accompanying text infra.
The Deep Seabed Act could have positive and negative effects on the ability of
the United States to conclude a treaty. By declaring the intent of Congress that
such a treaty should not "impose significant new economic burdens" on seabed
miners, Congress may have created barriers to its eventual acceptance of a treaty
that is bound to impose much greater financial obligations on private seabed miners than the Deep Seabed Act. See notes 239-64 and accompanying text infra. On
the other hand, some of the insecurity private seabed miners might feel in facing
the International Seabed Authority might be reduced by the Act and the reciprocating states provisions. These provisions will allow the miners to agree among
themselves who will seek which sites.
22. The seabed mining companies agreed to the Jan. 1, 1988 starting date for
commercial exploitation with the understanding that they would be allowed to
carry out "revenue producing" mining activities at 40 to 50% of full production
levels for the primary purpose of testing equipment prior to that date. 126 CONG.
REC. S7932 (daily ed. June 23, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson).
23. The Deep Seabed Act, supra note 18, §§ 102-07; 30 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1417
(1980).
24. See, e.g., T. IKRoImLEN THE LAwFumss OF DEEP SEABED MINING (1980);

Anand, The Legality of Interim Seabed Mining Regimes, 29 FoREIGN AFr. REP.
(New Delhi) 29 (1980); Auburn, Some Legal Problems of the Commercial Exploitation of Manganese Nodules in the Pacific Ocean, 1 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L" 185
(1973); Biggs, Deep Seabed Mining and UnilateralLegislation, 8 OCEAN DEV. &
IN'L L. 223 (1980); Burton, Freedom of the Seas: InternationalLaw Applicable to
Deep Seabed Mining Claims, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1135 (1977); Ely, The Laws Governing Exploitationof the MineralsBeneath the Sea, in EXPLOIMNG THE OCEAN 373
(1966); Goldie, A GeneralInternationalLaw Doctrinefor Seabed Regimes, 7 IerN'
L. 796 (1973); Goldie, Customary InternationalLaw and Deep Seabed Mining, 6
SYRACUSE J. I'L

& COM. 173 (1979); Saffo, The Common Heritageof Mankind: Has

the General Assembly Created a Law to Govern Seabed Mining?, 53 TtNE L.
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one more analysis seems justified because of the magnitude of
the issue, current events, and international legal obligations. This
article will explore all dimensions of this question but will start at
the heart of the issue: can seabed mining logically be viewed as a
freedom of the high seas?
II. THE FREEDOMS OF THE IGH SEAS: IS SEABED MINING ONE OF
THEM?

A.

The Text and Commentaries of the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas

Before the mid-1960's, few scholars argued that the exploitation
of the deep seabed was a freedom of the high seas. 25 Today, however, the United States and a few other developed countries argue
that the deep seabed is subject to the legal regime of the high
seas and that seabed mining is lawful as a freedom of the high
seas. 26 The source most often cited as showing that polymetallic
nodule mining is a freedom of the high seas has been the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 2 7 especially article 2 and its
associated Commentaries. 2 8
REV. 493 (1979); Note, Deepsea Ventures: Exclusive Mining Rights to the Deep Seabed as a Freedom of the Seas, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 170 (1976); Ely, Mining Rights in
the Deep Seabed (1975) (paper presented before the American Mining Congress,
San Francisco).
25. The treatises that took this position were 1 G. GIDEL, LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 498-501 (1932); A. HiGGmNS &C. CoLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 53-54 (2d ed. 1951); C. CoOLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE SEA 67 (6th ed. 1967).
26. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
27. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.IAS.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (1964).
28. See notes 29, 37, 38, 60 and accompanying text infra. The Commentaries
were written by the International Law Commission (ILC), which prepared the
draft articles for the Convention on the High Seas and the companion Conventions resulting from the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(hereinafter referred to as UNCLOS I). The other Conventions were: the Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311,
TS.A.S. No. 5578 (1964); the Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S.
285, TI.A.S. No. 5969; and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, TI.A.S. No. 5639.
The ILC was established by the United Nations to promote the progressive development and codification of international law. Its members are elected by the
General Assembly. During most of the time it debated the draft articles on the
law of the sea, its members were Gilberto Amado (Brazil), Douglas Edmonds
(United States), Gerald Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom), J. P. A. Francois (Netherlands), F. V. Garcia Amador (Cuba), Shuhsi Hsu (China), Faris el-Khouri (Syria),

The text of article 2 reads as follows:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by general principles
of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the29interests of other States in the exercise of the freedom of the
high seas.

This language is the key to the arguments made by Theodore G.
Kronmiller (now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs),30 the
United States Department of State in its official statements, 3 1 former Congressman John Murphy,3 2 Professor Stephen J. Burton,33
and Northcutt Ely.3 4 Their argument is that seabed mining is a
freedom of the high seas included among the unstated "inter
alia" because of language in the Commentaries.
The Commentaries, prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC), are not a part of the Convention on the High Seas;
they were never voted on by representatives of nations. But international law permits the use of travaux preparatoireslike the
Commentaries to elucidate the meaning of a treaty when the
treaty itself is ambiguous.3 5 Travaux preparatoiresare to be
S. B. Krylov (Soviet Union), Padilla Nervo (Mexico), Radhabinod Pal (India), Carlos Salamanca (Bolivia), A.E.F. Sandstrom (Sweden), Georges Scelle (France),
Jean Spiropoulos (Greece), and Jaroslav Zourek (Czechoslovakia). The ILC's role
is essentially advisory; it cannot bind nations to particular treaties.
29. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 27. By December 31, 1979, 56 nations, including the principal maritime nations, had ratified the Convention on the
High Seas. L HENIN, R. PuGn, 0. ScHACHTER, & H. Smrr, BASIc DocUMENT SupPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES & MATERIALS 81 (1980).
30. T. KROZmnIER, supra note 24, at 369-418.
31. See Brower statement, supra note 18.
32. "Under Article 2 of the Geneva High Seas Convention, which is generally
declaratory of principles of international law, the development of deep seabed resources is a freedom of the high seas." Murphy, The Politicsof Manganese Nodules: International Considerationsand Domestic Legislation, 16 SAN DIEGo L
REV. 531, 536 (1979).
33. Burton, supra note 24, at 1170-76.
34. Hearings on H.R. 11879 Before the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the
House Comm. on Interiorand Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 181-85 (1976)
(Brief for Deepsea Ventures, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Deepsea Brief].
35. See articles 31 and 32, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done
May 23, 1969, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.39/L27, at 289 (1969). 8 Ier'L L MATERIALS 679
(1969). These articles state that the travauxpreparatoiresof a negotiating conference can be used only as a "supplementary" means of interpretation, to be examined only when the language and primary sources of interpretation (a) leave
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used with caution: they are important only if they truly reflect
the intent of the parties. 36 The Commentaries would be important if (1) they help show the meaning given to the Convention by
the signatory nations, or (2) if the ILC in its deliberations had
found customary international law and expressed it in the
Commentaries.
The Commentaries to article 2 are elusive but arguably offer
some support for the idea that deep seabed mining is one of the
freedoms of the high seas. The first Commentary of the International Law Commission included the following language:
The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in this article is not restrictive; the Commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms. It is
aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom to explore or exploit
the subsoil of the,high seas and freedom to engage in scientific research
therein...

37

The second Commentary, prepared for submission to the United
Nations General Assembly with the draft articles of all of the
Conventions on the Law of the Sea, contained language that
seems to recognize the uncertainty of the subject:
The Commission has not made specific mention of the freedom to explore
or exploit the subsoil of the high seas. It considered that apart from the
case of the exploitation or exploration of the soil or subsoil of a continental shelf-a case dealt with separately in section III below-such exploitation had not
yet assumed sufficient practical importance to justify special
38
regulation.

The "exploitation or exploration of the soil or subsoil of a continental shelf' did not, of course, become a high seas freedom. Instead, it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State.3 9
As applied to the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction,
the meaning "ambiguous or obscure"; or (b) lead "to a result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable."
36. The International Court of Justice has been cautious in the use of travaux
preparatoires in treaty interpretation. A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TnATis 413
(1961); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the InternationalCourt of Tustice:
Treaty Interpretationand Certain Other Treaty Points, [1951] BRrr. Y.B. brr'L L. 1,
6 (1952). McNair concludes that preparatory work should be admissible only
"when it affords evidence of the common intention of both or all parties." A. McNAsa, supra, at 423.
37. [1955] 2 Y.B. Int' L Comm'n 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser. A. See notes 2736 and accompanying text supra, and notes 41-59 and accompanying text infra.
38. Report of ILC to General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/3159, also in U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 9) 24 (1956).
39. Convention on the Continental Shelf; art. 2, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (1964); Draft Convention, supra note 6, art.
77.

these oft-cited Commentaries are simply ambiguous. 40 Although
it is possible to read the Commentaries as stating that deep seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas, that is certainly not the
only possible interpretation. 4 1 More importantly, no evidence exists that this interpretation was adopted in the Convention42 or
that the Commentaries to article 2 express customary international law.43
The history and text of the Commentaries provide further evidence why they should not be used to make sweeping claims
about the legal status of the deep seabed. These Commentaries
were the product of a struggle of one of the members of the ILC,
Professor Georges Scelle, against the continental shelf doctrine.
Scelle, a Frenchman, believed that national jurisdiction over the
continental shelf violated the traditional freedom of the high
seas. 44 When it became clear that he would be unsuccessful in
opposing the continental shelf doctrine, Scelle pressed for an explicit limit to the continental shelf, beyond which the regime of
the high seas would apply. Scelle also objected to the ILC's failure to include seabed mining as a freedom of the high seas in its
draft article 2.45 The ambiguous language of the Commentaries
was apparently prepared in part to satisfy Scelle's concerns, and
he in fact said that he was "satisfied" with the Commentaries.46
They in effect side step the issues that divided the members of
the Commission.
Taken as a whole, the Commentaries point out the lack of interest in the deep seabed. Had the ILC considered the issue in detail, it is doubtful that it would have decided that deep seabed
mining was a freedom of the high seas. In the second Commentary to article 2,47 the ILC differentiated between the continental
shelf and the deep seabed and said that the continental shelf required "special regulation." This "special regulation" for the continental shelf that has evolved is not merely some variant of the
regime of the high seas; it is coastal state jurisdiction. If the deep
seabed had assumed "sufficient practical importance," the "special regulation" chosen for it likewise probably would not have
been the regime of the high seas.
40. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text Supra, and notes 44-51 and accompanying text iqfra.
41. See notes 44-51 and accompanying text infra.
42. See notes 44-59 and accompanying text infra.
43. See notes 44-51 and accompanying text infra.
44. See, e.g., [1955] 1 YXB. INT'L L COMM'N 7.
45. Id. at 58.
46. Id. at 282.
47. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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In fact, it is possible that the ILC would have proposed something like the "common heritage" idea for the deep seabed. Professor Scelle, the source of the Commentary's freedom of the seas
language on seabed mining, had earlier proposed an "international administrative authority set up within the framework of the
United Nations" to govern the exploitation of submerged areas
beyond the territorial sea.4A8 It is ironic that his efforts at the ILC
are now used as the primary authority to argue that such an international authority should not govern the deep seabed.
Even if the first Commentary is read to state that deep seabed
mining is a freedom of the high seas, 49 it cannot be seriously argued that this Commentary was expressing or codifying customary international law. The ILC's members, including Scelle, never
mentioned any precedent, practice or authority for finding such a
freedom.5 0 It is puzzling that the ILC's members never mentioned the res nullius alternative for the deep seabed, even
though that was the clear preference of scholars up to that time.5 '
48. [1955] 1 YB. h'r'L L Comas'N 7, 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L51.
49. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
50. The only discussion of this aspect of the Commentary came when Jaroslav
Zourek, another member of the ILC, objected that "the question of exploitation of
the subsoil of the high seas had not been discussed at the present session and furthermore no such right existed in international law." [1955] 1 Y.B. ITr'L L COWm'N
282, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A. Scelle met this objection only by commenting that
he "knew of no rule prohibiting the exploration and exploitation, where possible,
of the subsoil of the high seas." Id. Scelle's comment that no prohibitory rule exists, if accepted, still does not establish that mining is a freedom of the high seas.
There would be no prohibitory rule if the law were silent on the deep seabed, or if
the seabed were a res nullius. See notes 117-128 and accompanying text infra.
51. See notes 97-105 and accompanying text infra. The ILC had discussed and
rejected res nullius for the continental shelf, but the reasons for that rejection-to
prevent noncontiguous nations from claiming continental shelves adjacent to
other countries-would not necessarily apply to deep ocean basins hundreds or
thousands of miles from land.
To understand the work of UNCLOS I fully with respect to the deep seabed, the
Convention on the Continental Shelf must also be considered. See note 28 supra
and note 89 infra. The Convention on the Continental Shelf raised the question of
whether jurisdiction over the continental shelf had any limit beyond that imposed
by technology.
A few nations-mainly those not blessed with ample continental shelves--opposed the doctrine entirely, arguing that the exploitation of all submerged areas
beyond the territorial sea was a high seas freedom. 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec. 7-8,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/42 (summary of remarks of Mr. Pfeiffer, West German delegate). This point of view failed, but in asserting jurisdiction over the continental
shelf, few nations declared any position with regard to the legal status of the deep
seabed beyond.
The Indian delegate posed the question: if continental shelf jurisdiction ended
at 200 metres, what regime, if any, was proposed for the exploitation of the area

The texts of the Conventions produced at UNCLOS I are obviously more important than the ILC's Commentaries. There the
record is clear: no decision was made, even implicitly, on the legal status of the deep seabed. Although article 2 with its "inter
alia" language was adopted, no evidence indicates that seabed
52
mining was meant to be among the inter alia.
beyond? Id. at 34 (summary of remarks of Mr. Gros, a delegate of France). It appears that Lebanon shared this concern. Id. at 38 (summary of remarks of Mr.
Fattal, delegate from Lebanon). France was almost alone in specifying the status
of submerged lands beyond the continental shelf as high seas. To the other delgates, the "exploitability" clause in the definition of continental shelf jurisdiction
[see note 89 infra] apparently made the question of no practical importance. Because exploitation was expected to proceed incrementally down the continental
shelf, national jurisdiction would extend to cover it. Exploitation leap-frogging to
mid-ocean-for polymetallic nodules, for instance-was unforeseen.
In its instrument of accession to the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
France declared with respect to article 1 that "the expression, 'adjacent' areas, implies a notion of geophysical, geological, and geographical dependence which ipso
facto rules out an unlimited extension of the continental shelf." Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions,
List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. as of 31 December, 1979, at 584,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. D/13. The United States and United Kingdom were unwilling to commit themselves to the French position. The United States declared
in September 1965 that it noted the French declaration "without prejudice." Id. at
586. The United Kingdom representative said in 1966 that the declaration "does
not call for any observations on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom." Id.
52. Seabed mining beyond the continental shelf is not mentioned at all in the
discussions of article 2. 4 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec. at 37-56, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/40
(1958). The only explicit proposal to add to the four freedoms specified by the ILC
was from Portugal, which wanted to include a freedom of exploration and scientific research. Id. at 55, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.7 (1958). This proposal was
rejected. Id.
A further problem exists with the use of the Commentaries to determine the
meaning of article 2. The Commentaries speak only of the subsoil of the high seas,
not the seabed. The distinction between seabed and subsoil had been of cardinal
importance to many earlier writers on the submerged regions beyond the territorial sea. Saffo, supra note 24, at 504 n.51. To some, the "seabed" was the two-dimensional interface between the waters of the ocean and the ocean floor; the
"subsoil" was the underlying rock strata. Polymetaflic nodules rest on the seabed;
petroleum deposits are in the subsoil.
To some writers, although national claims to the seabed might jeopardize the
freedom of navigation on the high seas, claims to the subsoil need not create such
threats because the subsoil could be exploited by lateral mines driven from shore.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIoNAL LAvW 133-35 (8th ed. 1955); C. CoLOMB-US (1967),
supra note 25.
By the mid-1950s lateral mines for coal had been driven into the subsoil of offshore waters of England, France, Chile, and other countries. Some mines went beyond the three-mile territorial sea, as deep as 1100 meters. [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMIa'N 131. The conferees at UNCLOS I needed to recognize the legitimacy of
such mines, but did not want them included under the continental shelf doctrine,
because they might have immediately extended the "exploitability" limit to 1100
meters. Their solution was to sanction such mining by coastal states separately in
article 7 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 28.
It is entirely possible that delegates to UNCLOS I could have read the article 2
Commentaries as referring only to lateral mines, or referring only to the subsoil
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In fact, the Convention on the High Seas appears to exclude the
deep seabed altogether from the "high seas" as it defines that
term. Article 1 gives us the definition: "The term 'high seas'
means all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial
sea or in the internal waters of a State."5 3 The Comment of the
International Law Commission adds:
The waters of the sea belong either to the high seas or to the territorial
sea or to internal waters. In the part of the present report dealing with
the territorial sea, the Commission has attempted to define the limits of
the territorial sea and indicated the base lines from which it should be
measured. Waters within these base lines constitute internal waters. Article 1 and the articles contained in the chapter on the territorial sea thus
furnish a definition of the high seas. 5 4

This definition of the high seas includes only the waters. When
the ILC wanted to declare that the seabed of a region was subject
to the same regime as the waters of the region, it did so in explicit
terms. For example, the ILC's Commentary to the Draft Convention on the Territorial Sea declares: "The sovereignty of a coastal
state extends also to the air space over the territorial sea as well
as to its bed and subsoil."55
The Convention on the igh Seas recognizes that the laying of
cables and pipelines on the bed of the high seas is a freedom of
the high seas.56 But this recognition does not imply that seabed
mining is a freedom of the high seas or that the seabed is to be
considered as part of the"high seas for all uses. The right to lay
submarine cables and pipelines is a high seas freedom of all nations, even when the cables or pipes are placed on the continental
shelf of another nation.57
but not the seabed. The ILC usually employed a seabed-subsoil distinction in its
other draft articles and commentaries, using "seabed" to refer to activities on the
ocean floor, "subsoil" to refer to petroleum and other deposits in the substrata,
and "seabed and subsoil" or "bed and subsoil" in referring to both regions. See,
e.g., Report of ILC, supra note 38 (Draft articles 2, 10, 48, and 61; Commentaries to
Articles 10, 16, 49, 67, 68, and 71). The delegates to UNCLOS I often used the seabed-subsoil distinction in their discussions (although not necessarily implying a
juridical difference between the two). See, e.g., 6 UNCLOS I, Off Rec. at 40, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.13/42 (1958) (summary of remarks of M. Whiteman, United States
delegate, that "subsoil could be exploited through lateral mines").
53. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 27, art 1.
54. 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) 3.
55. [1955] 2 Y.B. IN'L L. Com'N 35, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A.
56. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 27, article 2 and article 26.
57. Under article 26 of the Convention on the High Seas, supra note 27, and
article 4 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 28, the coastal
state may not impede the laying of cables or pipelines on its continental shelf, un-

Cable-laying is a classic example of an activity that is a high
seas freedom because of the nature of the activity. It is very similar to the traditional high seas freedom of navigation. Cables and
pipelines do not interfere with the ability of others to use the
oceans for the same purposes. Cables cross each other freely
pipelines can cross with appropriate engineering design. They
use only a tiny portion of the ocean bottom. Cable-laying is entirely different than the exploitation of mineral resources, which
are exhaustible.5 8 To the ILC, the nature of the activity was controlling, not the region in which it occurred, cable-laying on the
continental shelf is a freedom of the high seas, but mineral exploitation on the continental shelf is the right of the coastal nation alone.5 9 Similarly, the high seas freedom to lay cables on the
deep seabed in no way implies that the mineral exploitation of
the deep seabed is also a freedom of the high seas.
B. Is the Analogy Logical?
The meaning of article 2 can therefore also be examined from
the perspective of the nature of usage and logic.60 Whether seabed mining should be included as a high seas freedom should
turn in the final analysis on whether it is logical to do so, in other
words, whether seabed mining is analogous to the four listed freedoms in terms of the impact of mining on other competing uses
and on the interests of other states. It has been observed that
"[t] he relevance of an analogy depends of course on the degree to
which common policy is found to underlie both the analogy and
61
With this observation as a guide, it will
the new problem ....,,
be seen that to call seabed mining a freedom of the high seas is
an unwarranted extension of that doctrine, a total contradiction of
the policies and principles underlying the freedom of the seas.
The arguments in favor of the freedoms of the high seas are
usually traced to Grotius. He wrote that the seas must be free for
navigation and fishing because natural law forbids the ownership
less the cables or pipelines interfere with its exploitation of the natural resources
of its continental shelf
Although the right to lay submarine cables on the bed of the high seas was
never challenged or questioned from the time the activity began in the late 18601s,

[1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 199 (remarks of Judge Hudson), it was a long time
before scholars in international law began to recognize cable-laying as a freedom
of the seas. M. McDouGAL &W. BunxE, THE PULIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 755-56
(1962), citing OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 338 (1905) (cable-laying a "consequence" of the freedom of the seas.)
58. See notes 67-72 and accompanying text infra.
59. See note 57 supra.
60. For the negotiating history and interpretation of article 2, see notes 27-36,
41-59 and accompanying text supra.
61. M. MCDOUGAL &W. BuRKE,supra note 57, at 13 n.32.
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of things that seem "to have been created by nature for common
use."6 2 Things for common use are those that "can be used without loss to anyone else .... "63 For example, the use of the seas
for navigation by one nation does not diminish the potential for
the same use by others. 4 Since Grotius, the freedom of the seas
has outgrown its natural-law roots; now both navigation and
fisheries require some regulation. 65 Nevertheless, the rules that
developed governing the use of the sea as a common resource
were tied to the special character of those uses. For example,
States are free today to navigate and fish on the high seas so long
as they do not diminish the resource or prejudice the future ability of other nations to use the seas. 66 The new uses that were recognized as freedoms of the seas, such as cable-laying and
scientific research,6 7 also did not diminish the use of the sea by
others.
In contrast, seabed mining for polymetallic nodules is entirely
different from any use previously recognized as a high seas freedom. Polymetallic nodules are an exhaustible resource, nonrenewable on any human time frame.68 Deposits of polymetallic
62. L GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM 28 (Magofaln trans. 1916).
63. Id. at 27.

64. Id. at 28.
65. The freedom of the high seas is exercised subject to the duty to pay a reasonable regard to the interests of others. The MariannaFlora 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.)
1 (1826); Convention on the High Seas, supra, note 27, art. 2.
66. Fisheries, though exhaustible, are renewable if properly managed. When
it became clear that such management was essential, the international community
made efforts to impose management agreements, Convention on Fishing aald the
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, supra note 28. Pollution of
the high seas, another "freedom," was probably originally thought to injure no
one. When it became obvious that it did, pollution too became subject to special
agreements. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, (1954) 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.IAS. Nos. 4900, 6109, 8505, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 (as

amended); Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matters, done Nov. 13, 1972, 11 Ir'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1294
(1972).
67. Not all uses claimed under the label of "scientific research" have been accepted by all as freedoms of the seas. The nuclear bomb tests in the Pacific have
been extremely controversial. Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and InternationalLaw, 64 YALE L.T. 629 (1955) (tests by U.S.); Australia v. France, [1974]
LCJ. 253; New Zealand v. France, [1974] LCJ. 457 (tests by France).
68. References have been made to the 'renewability" of the manganese nodules, based upon the misinterpretation of a comment in Mero, Review of Mineral
Values on or Under the Ocean Floor, in ExPLorrING THE OCEAN 61, 75-76 (1966),

that the nodules, which grow by accretion, were adding perhaps ten million tons
per year to their aggregate bulk throughout the world's oceans. Although the entire mass of the nodules in the oceans-perhaps totaling trillions of tons-might

nodules differ dramatically in their economic value,6 9 and the deposits that are economically attractive in the near future are limited. If exploited vigorously, the prime mine sites could be
completely exhausted within a few decades. 70 Mining could still
be increasing by millions of tons per year, individual nodules grow very slowly,
perhaps requiring millions of years to reach "harvestable" size. Any economically
interesting deposit of nodules, once mined, will not be replaced for hundreds of
thousands of years-if ever. Nodules are, in practical terms, no different than
other nonrenewable mineral resources.
69. Economic analyses agree that to compete with terrestrial mines, a nodule
deposit will have to contain at least 2.2 to 2.4% combined nickel and copper. Many
of the nodules in the ocean have less than a quarter as much. The deposit should
have an abundance of 5 to 10 kilograms of nodules per square meter of ocean floor.
Frazer, supra note 7, and sources cited therein; Kaufman, The Selection and Sizing
of Tracts Comprising a Manganese Nodule Ore Body, 11 OFFSHORE TEcH. CoNF.
PREPRiNTS 283 (1974). Deposits of sufficient quality have been found only in the
Clarion and Clipperton Fracture Zone. See J. FRAZER & M. FSx, supra note 7.
Nodules with lower metal content will be much less profitable to exploit. NYHART,
ANTm, CAPSTAFF, KOHLER, &LEsHAw, A COST MODEL OF DEEP OCEAN MINING AND
ASSOCIATED REGULATORY ISSUES ES-9 (1978) (hereinafter cited as MIT MODEL);
Welling, Manganese Nodule Mining: A Risk Management Assessment, in DEEP
OCEAN MINING 61, 68 (J. Flipse ed. 1979). The MIT Model projected that decreasing
the nickel-copper grade from 2.8% to 2% would cause a drop in the internal rate of
return from 18.14% to 11.16%. Welling (Vice-president of Ocean Minerals Co.) indicated that decreasing the nickel grade from 1.5% to 1% would reduce the internal rate of return by about 35%.
70. How fast the best nodule deposits will be used up depends upon the size
of the economically valuable resource and the pace and progress of seabed mining. The size of the reserves can be discussed either in terms of the total tonnage
of nodules or in terms of "prime mine sites." Although terrestrial mineral
reserves are usually estimated in terms of total tonnage, in seabed mining it has
become more common, and more useful, to speak of prime mine sites, because a
consensus exists that each mining project, in order to obtain economies of scale
and to operate long enough to recoup its investment, will need a mine site with a
specified amount of nodules of sufficient quality. A prime mine site is usually defined as one large enough to provide a miner with 3 million tons per year of nodules for 20 or 25 years, Flipse, Dubs, & Greenwald, Preproduction Manganese
Nodule Mining Activities and Requirements, in Hearingson Mineral Resources of
the Deep Seabed, S.1134, Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 607-14 (1973); 1 DAMEs & MOORE, DESCRIPTION OF MANGANESE
NODULE PROCESSING ACTIvrrIES FOR ENmOiNimENTAL STUDIS 2-7 (1977). The size
of such a mine site could range from roughly 25,000 to 110,000 square kilometers,
Flipse, Dubs, & Greenwald, supra, with 50,000 square kilometers being a rough average. See Frazer, supra note 7, at 116.
The number of prime sites is controversial. Earlier estimates ranged up to 185.
See Frazer, supra note 7 and sources cited therein. These high estimates served
the purposes of the United States government in quelling the fears of foreign nations that American firms, which have a technological lead in seabed mining,
would monopolize the resource. But the best estimates based on the most comprehensive data in the public domain now center around 28 with a possible range
from 14 to 56 sites. See Frazer, supra note 7. If all of the hypothetical 28 sites
were being exploited in the year 2000 at the rate of 3 million tons per year, they
would produce about 56% of the world's projected nickel consumption for that
year. Seabed mining will probably expand more slowly, because of the huge capital costs-perhaps $1 billion for each project-and technological hurdles. One projection, admittedly a guess, indicates that ten 3-million ton per year projects could
be operating by the year 2000, and about thirty by 2010. National Oceanic and At-
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continue on poorer sites because, as the technology improves,
seabed mining should become more competitive with terrestrial
mining. But the first miners will take the better sites. Many of
these better mine sites have already been identified and explored
by scientific groups and by the private seabed mining consortia.
For example, Deepsea Ventures, the predecessor of one of the
seabed mining consortia, filed a "claim of discovery" for a 60,000
square kilometer tract of seabed in November 1974.71 Deepsea's
"claim" lies almost entirely within a 180,000 square kilometer area
which apparently "is the most promising for seabed mining of all
the areas studied."72
The traditional high seas freedoms have favored the technologically advanced nations in the use of the oceans. The nations able
to equip fleets capable of fishing in distant waters benefited from
the freedom of fishing; the great maritime nations benefited from
the freedom of navigation. These advantages resulted from the already privileged situation of the developed nations, but at least
these uses by developed nations did not exhaust the possibility
that other less developed nations might someday share, on equal
terms, the great common resource of the oceans, undegraded by
3
the prior use of others.7
Because of these logical and practical problems, neither the ILC
nor the delegates to UNCLOS I committed themselves on the legal status of the deep seabed during the debates of the 1950's. All
resources that were expected to be important were, by definition,
included in the continental shelf by the "exploitability" critemospheric Administration, Office of Ocean Minerals and Energy, Deep Seabed
Mining 268 (Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement) (1981). If a
seabed treaty is signed, it will probably contain a ceiling on seabed production.
Under the present draft, the ceiling depends on the growth in the world nickel

market, but under projected nickel growth, the ceiling would allow about fifteen 3million ton per year operations in 2002. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SEABED MINING
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 3 (Current Policy No. 233, speech of Elliot Richardson to
the American Mining Congress, Sept. 24, 1980); Draft Convention, supra note 6,
art 151.

71. For more on Deepsea's claim, which no government recognized, see Biggs,
Deepsea's Adventures: Grotius Revisited, 9 INT'L LAW. 271 (1975); Burton, supra
note 24, at 1140-51; Note, supra note 24; 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 51 (1975).
72. J. FRAZER & M. FisK, supra note 7, at 59.
73. For a similar argument rejecting the analogy of navigation to ocean thermal energy conversion as a high seas freedom because energy conversion reduces
the use of the oceans for that purpose by others, see Knight, InternationalJuris-

dictionalIssues ConcerningOTEC, in OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION 45, 60
(Knight, Nyhart, & Stein eds. 1977).

rion.7 4 The delegates and the members of the ILC expected future seabed exploitation to progress by gradual increments down
the continental shelf. J.P.A. Francois, the Rapporteur of the ILC
who drafted the Commentaries, expressed the general attitude:
It seems to the Rapporteur that the Commission will not have to consider
the freedom of States to explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas
outside the continental shelf. The construction of permanent installations
for that purpose in sea areas where the depth exceeds 200 metres is at
present
impossible, and is likely to remain so for some considerable
75
time.

The delegate from the United States made remarks that showed a
similar disbelief that the deep seabed would ever be exploited.
The official summary of her remarks was as follows: "Exploration
could not, however, continue indefinitely toward the middle of the
ocean; the continental slope fell away steeply and rapidly, so that
exploitation beyond a certain limit would not be an economic
proposition." 76 An official report to UNCLOS I indicated that ex77
ploitation beyond 200 meters was unlikely.
Now that exploitation of the deep seabed is possible, delegates
from the United States and some other western nations are arguing that seabed mining has been and is now included among the
freedoms of the high seas. It is not surprising that the developing
nations have protested against this effort. These protests, apart
from their value as evidence that seabed mining is not now a freedom under customary law, also serve another important function
of preventing seabed mining from becoming a high seas freedom.
Throughout the history of the uses of the high seas, the consensus of the international community has been extremely important
in assessing the permissibility of new uses. In an oft-quoted passage discussing the evolution of the regime of the high seas, McDougal and Schlei commented:
[T] he public order of the high seas.., is a continuous process of interaction in which the decision-makers of individual nation-states unilaterally
put forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting character to the use
of the world's seas, and in which other decision makers, external to the
demanding nation-state and including both national and international officials, weigh and appraise these competing claims in terms of the interests
of the world community,
and of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept
78
or reject them.

Truly novel uses of the seas, to be lawful, thus require the con74. See note 89 infra.
75. The Regime of the High Seas and the Regime of the TerritorialSea, U.N.
Doc. A/CN. 4/97 (1956) (Francois, rapporteur).
76. 6 UNCLOS I, Off Rec. at 40, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/42 (1958) (Summary of
remarks of M. Whiteman).
77. M~outon, Recent Developments in the Technology of Exploiting the Mineral
Resources of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/25 (1958).
78. McDougal & Schlei, Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawfid Measures
for Security, 64 YALE L. 648, 655-56 (1955).
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sent of the international community, either overtly or through
toleration.
It has been argued that the high seas are "open to all nations"
and that consent of the international community is not required
for their use.7 9 Although it is true that no nation now requires
consent to navigate or to fish on the high seas, the analysis of McDougal and Schlei leads to the conclusion that these uses are now
freedoms because consent to them has long been given. To
change these longstanding freedoms would require extremely serious actions by the international community.8 0 When a truly
novel 8 ' use arises such as seabed mining, the present consent of
nations becomes especially important in determining whether the
use is a freedom of the high seas. The vast majority of the international community has emphatically refused to consent to seabed mining as a freedom of the high seas.
C. Summary
The "high seas freedom" argument rests upon a questionable
interpretation of two Commentaries prepared by the ILC, Commentaries done with inadequate discussion at a time when no one
considered the deep seabed to be of practical significance. Because they were not subsequently endorsed at UNCLOS I, the
Commentaries are weak legal authority. The deep seabed was
not considered part of the high seas in customary international
law.8 2 The 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
left this question unresolved.83 The treaties prepared by that
Conference do not include the deep seabed in definitions of the
high seas in a geographical sense, nor do they list seabed mining
as one of the freedoms of the high seas.M Despite ample opportunity, few nations committed themselves on the seabed issue.
79. Burton, supra note 24, at 1160.
80. For example, U.N. General Assembly resolutions like those dealing with
seabed mining would not be given as much weight if they challenged a well-accepted freedom such as navigation. See notes 131-45 and accompanying text infra.
81. Uses that are truly novel must be distinguished from uses that, although
new, are really subsumed under another activity. An example of the latter would
be the commercial harvest of a previously unexploited species of fish. Although a
"new" activity, this fishing would clearly be permitted under the generic 'freedom
of fishing."
82. See notes 27-36, 41-59 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 27-34 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 29, 53-55 and accompanying text supra.

Equally significant is the logical problem that arises if one includes seabed mining as a high seas freedom. All the other high
seas freedoms are compatible uses, uses that do not diminish the
potential for the same use by others. Polymetallic nodules are a
finite resource from an economic perspective. The exploitation of
the prime mine sites in the near future by the technologically advanced nations will deny developing nations access to this resource at a later time. Polymetallic nodules do not, therefore, fit
into the concept Grotius developed, of things that seem "to have
been created by nature for common use."85
A review of the treaties on this subject and an analysis of the
policies and logic behind the concept of high seas freedoms,
therefore, lead to the conclusion that deep seabed mining is not a
freedom of the high seas.
IH. THE "RES NuL.us" ARGUmENT
The previous section has examined the claim of the United
States and a few developed nations that deep seabed mining is a
freedom of the high seas. A few spokespersons for seabed mining
interests have argued instead that the seabed is a res nullius,
open to exploitation and exclusive claims by the first occupier.86
One writer, Theodore G. Kronmiller, in a book published by the
United States Department of Commerce, has taken a dual approach: the seabed may be either a res nullius or under the regime of the high seas; but in either case, deep seabed mining is
presently lawful. 87
These analyses rely primarily on events predating the rise of international interest in the deep seabed that began in the mid1960's.88 The previous section documented that before the mid1960's the legal status of the deep seabed outside the continental
shelf was unsettled. The next section demonstrates that international law provides no substantial basis for considering the deep
seabed to be a res nullius.
Before the mid-1960's, few uses had been made of the deep seabed beyond the continental shelf,8 9 and few were contemplated. 90
85. H. Grotius, mupra note 62.
86. See notes 89-116 and accompanying text infra.
87. T. KOmNmzER, supra note 24.
88. Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta is generally credited with triggering this
interest by his famous speech to the UN General Assembly in 1967. U.N. Doc. A/
6695 (1967).
89. The "continental shelf' was defined by Article 1 of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, supra note 28:
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf' is used as
referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to
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Cables had been laid across the deep seabed since the mid-nineteenth century, but except in coastal areas where they might foul
fishing gear, they had spawned no conflicts requiring legal resolution.91 Some oceanographic research of the deep seabed had occurred; but like cable-laying, these caused no controversies. As a
result, writers on international law paid little attention to the
deep seabed.
Early writers on the seabed generally did not distinguish between the continental shelf and the deep seabed, although they
were usually more concerned with the practical issues that might
be posed by the use of the continental shelf.92 These early writers treated the seabed (including the continental shelf) either as
a res nullius or as a res communis.9 3 This disagreement resulted
from two conflicting analogies for the seabed. If the seabed is like
unclaimed land, it is a res nullius; if it is like the high seas, it is a
res communis. 94 In practical terms, no nation can claim exclusive
the coast but outside of the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to
the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts
of islands.
Most commentators feel that the "adjacency" requirement puts some limit to the
seaward extension of continental shelf jurisdiction, although a few have argued
that the definition would make the oceans "national lakes" with national boundaries in mid-ocean once technology made the exploitation of deep ocean resources
such as polymetallic nodules feasible. Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful
Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 135/19 (1968). The view that some limit exists to potential
continental shelf jurisdiction has been greatly strengthened by a series of U.N.
General Assembly resolutions regarding the deep seabed: GA. Res. 2340 (XXII);
U.N.G.A. Res. 2467 (XXI); GA. Res. 2574 (XXIV); and GA. Res. 2749 (XXV);
which all state that there is a seabed area beyond national jurisdiction. The Draft
Convention of UNCLOS II, supra note 6, also supports this conclusion. See Articles 1, 76, 136 et seq. [Hereinafter in this article, it will be assumed that continental shelf is limited to submarine areas that are the natural prolongation of land
masses, and that beyond these areas is the "deep seabed," which contains the economically interesting deposits of polymetallic nodules. For geological reasons, the
best nodules are far from land. See, however, notes 262-63 and accompanying text
infra, for a discussion of a possible exception.]
90. See notes 38, 75-77 and accompanying text supra for the expectations of
delegates at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
91. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
92. See, e.g., Hurst,Whose is the Bed of the Sea? [1923-24] BrT. Y.B. INT'L L.34
(concerned with sedentary species); L OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 628 (8th
ed. 1955) (concerned with tunneling under the English channel).
93. See authorities cited in note 97 infra and note 25 supra.
94. One writer disputes the identity of res communis with the regime of the
high seas. Burton, supra note 24, at 1160 n.29. He argues that a true res communis

rights or sovereignty over a res communis or over the high seas, 95
but a nation can acquire exclusive rights to a res nullius through
9
occupation. 6
The res nullius theory enjoyed a surge of popularity in the late
1940's and early 1950's, 97 when it was invoked to provide a legal

justification for the then-novel national claims to the exclusive
right to exploit natural resources, chiefly petroleum, on adjacent
continental shelves.9 8 These res nullius advocates used as their
primary example the longstanding recognition that certain nations had the exclusive right to exploit sedentary fisheries on the
seabed contiguous to their territory but outside their territorial
limits. These claims included the regulation of pearl fisheries by
Ceylon, Australia, Mexico, and Colombia, and the Italian and
French regulation of coral in the Mediterranean. 99 All of the
sedentary fisheries were located in areas that are now juridically
considered continental shelves.100
The evolution of the "continental shelf doctrine"'O1 makes res
nullius obsolete as an explanation for the regulation of sedentary
species. In fact, occupation of a res nullius was thoroughly considered and emphatically rejected by the Convention on the Continental Shelf as the basis for national jurisdiction over the
requires community consent for its use, while the high seas are open to all. It is
not clear that the early writers who stated that the seabed was a res communis
would require formal consent for its use. See authorities cited in note 25 supra.
In addition, as shown in notes 62-81 and accompanying text supra, the use of the
high seas contains an element of consent.
95. See notes 25-52 and accompanying text supra.
96. For a discussion of the difficulty of determining what constitutes "occupation" or "constructive possession" of a polymetallic nodule deposit under res nullius theory, see notes 224-36 and accompanying text infra.
97. See, e.g., OPPENHEIm, supra note 92; 1 SWARTZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 127 (4th ed. 1960); Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, [1950] BrT. Y.B. IN''L L. 376, 402; O'Connell, Sedentary Fisheries and the
Australian Continental Shelf, 49 Am. J.INT'L L. 185, 190 (1955); Young, The Legal
Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 645 (1968); INTERNATIONAL
LAW AssOcIATION, REPORT OF THE 44TH CONFERENCE 90 (1950)

(rapporteur J.

Feith). T. KRONmuLLER, supra note 24, at 202, concludes that the "greater weight of
authority" is that the seabed beyond national jurisdiction is a res nullius. One
other author also concludes that the res nullius viewpoint approached a consensus
prior to the mid-1960s. Saffo, supra note 24, at 505.
98. See, e.g., The Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf, Presidential
Proclamation No. 2667 (Sept. 28, 1945), 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Comp.), 13 DEP'T
STATE BuLL 485 (1945), declaring the sole jurisdiction and control by the United
States of "the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States . . ."
which began a series of national claims to continental shelves. The United States
and most other claimant states expressed no specific legal basis for their claims.
99. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 696-698 (1911).

100. Burton, supra note 24, at 1154.
101. See note 89 supra.

[voL. 19: 493, 1982]

Governing the Seabed
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

continental shelf. 02 The coastal State has jurisdiction over the
continental shelf because it is the "natural prolongation of its
land territory." 03 The coastal State need make no occupation in
order to obtain jurisdiction over the continental shelf; such jurisdiction exists "ipsofacto and ab initio."104 A prior act of occupation by another State cannot defeat the coastal State's
jurisdiction.
Res nullius was politically unacceptable to the drafters of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf because it would have permitted the first "occupant" to claim a continental shelf-even if
the occupying nation was not adjacent to the shelf. For example,
had the United States been the first to drill for oil in the North
Sea, under a res nullius theory the United States would arguably
have been able to claim exclusive rights to the North Sea oil
fields. The rejection of res nullius for the continental shelf is now
105
firmly established in international law.
102. Article 2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf provides:
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in
the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or
exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or
make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the
coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.
See generally 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/42 (1958). No nation
argued that the continental shelf was a res nullius in the sense that it could be
claimed by the first occupier.
103. North Sea Continental Shell Cases, [1969] LCJ. 3, 19.
104. Id
105. See note 102 supra. The International Court of Justice has held[t]he Court entertains no doubt [that] the most fundamental of all the
rules of law relating to the continental shelf enshrined in Article 2 of the
1958 Geneva Convention, though quite independent of it, [is] that the
rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that
constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the
sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the
land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In
short, there is here an inherent right. In order to exercise it, no special
legal process has to be gone through, nor have any special legal acts to be
performed. Its existence can be declared (and many States have done
this) but does not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does not
depend on it being exercised. To echo the language of the Geneva Convention, it is "exclusive" in the sense that if the coastal State does not
choose to explore or exploit the areas of shelf appertaining to it, that is its
own affair, but no one else may do so without its express consent.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] LCJ. 3, 19.

Because the continental shelf did not become a res nullius
zone, virtually no authority supports the proposition that the deep
seabed should be considered as such a zone. Certainly the sedentary species examples'06 are weak authority. Upon close examination, the legitimacy of such claims by nations seems to have
been based on prescription, rather than on the occupation of a res
nullius.107 In addition, the practice seems far from universal; one
could surely find many sedentary and demersal fisheries that
were not claimed by a single nation.
Despite the rejection of res nullius for the continental shelf, a
few writers have nonetheless maintained that the deep seabed regions beyond the shelf are res nullius. The most active of these
writers, Northcutt Ely' 08 and L.F.E. Goldie,109 have at one time or
another been retained by companies that hope to mine polymetallic nodules. The res nullius status would give these companies
significant advantages because they have already explored many
of the best mining areas and would be in a good position to claim
the best sites. 110 Res nullius status would allow companies to
avoid the international mechanism and revenue-sharing obligations of the "common heritage" approach. Most importantly, the
occupier of the res nullius could claim exclusive rights to a particular area, which is impossible under the regime of the high
seas."'In addition to the sedentary species arguments,112 Ely and
Goldie support their res nullius theory with a few examples of
claims to exclusive rights to previously unclaimed land, abandoned property or mineral deposits."13 These analogies are un-

convincing because the writers assume their conclusion; they
start from the perspective that the seabed is like unclaimed land,
which is the assumption that divided commentators into the res
nullius and res communis camps. Even acceptance of the analogy
to land does not decide the issue, because all unclaimed land has
not automatically been treated as terra nullius in international
106. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.

107. Hurst, supra note 92.
108. See Ely, supra note 24; Deepsea Brief, supra note 34, at 158.
109. Goldie, A GeneralInternationalLaw Doctrinefor Seabed Regimes, 7 INT'L
LAW 796 (1973); Goldie, CustomaryInternationalLaw and Deep Seabed Mining, 6
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &COM. 173 (1979).
110. See, for example, the discussion of Deepsea Ventures "claim" to 60,000
square kilometers of the floor of the Pacific Ocean in text at note 71 supra.
111. See notes 214-36 and accompanying text infra.
112. Ely argues that the sedentary species claims are relevant to the deep seabed because at the time they were made and recognized, no juridical difference
existed between the continental shelf and the deep seabed. Deepsea Brief, supra
note 34, at 169.
113. Goldie, A GeneralInternationalLaw Doctrinefor Seabed Regime, 7 INTL.
LAW 796, 807-11 (1973); Deepsea Brief, supra note 34, at 202-205.
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law, subject to the exclusive possession of the first occupier. For
example, the United States and the Soviet Union have steadfastly
refused to recognize claims of sovereignty to parts of Antarctica,1 4 and the international community was quick to deny the
possibility of claims to national sovereignty to outer space or celestial boundaries."15
The analogies of Ely and Goldie do not, in any event, make law.
Nations cannot be required to accept that principles used to establish jurisdiction over unclaimed land must apply to the deep
seabed, absent some prior practice or treaty that the seabed is
subject to the same rules as unclaimed land. Since 1967, the international community, including the United States, has emphatically rejected the proposition that the deep seabed is a res
nullius.116
IV.

THE ARGUMENT THAT "1WHAT Is NOT
PROHIBrrED, IS PERMITTED"

Some advocates for the mining consortia have offered, as a separate and distinct argument, the theory that seabed mining is permitted because no international law principle specifically
prohibits it."7 This theory differs from the argument that new
uses of the high seas do not require consent in that it is broader
and more inclusive: no new activities of sovereign nations require
consent, absent a prohibitory rule." 8 The principle that "what is
not prohibited, is permitted" is one that appears from time to
time in international law. Ely and Pietrowski cite the cases of the
S.-S. Lotus" 9 and the FisheriesCase'2 0 for this proposition. In the
Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice held by
a divided vote that the Turkish government could exercise criminal jurisdiction over the officer of a French ship which collided
with a Turkish ship in international waters because such jurisdic114. J. KiSH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 72 (1973).
115. See, e.g., Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant"InternationalCustomary Law? 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L.23 (1965); Agreement Governing
the Activities in the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, U.N.G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N.
Dec. A/34/664 (1979), 18 IN'L LEGAL MATERIlS 1434 (1979).
116. See notes 129-58 and accompanying text infra.
117. Deepsea Brief, supra note 34, at 1160.
118. The distinction is best shown in that the "absence of a prohibitory rule"
argument need not assert that seabed mining is a high seas freedom.
119. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.J., Ser. A, No. 10.
120. The Fisheries Case, [1951] LC.J. Rep. 116.

tion, although not expressly allowed by international law, was
also not forbidden by international law.12 ' In the Fisheries Case,
the International Court of Justice held that although Norway's
claim to draw straight baselines connecting the outer limits of its
indented coast was unusual, no rule of international law prohibited it.
Both cases are now accepted as good law, not because international law permits whatever is not specifically prohibited, but
rather because the result in each case makes sense on its facts.
Turkey's assertion of jurisdiction in Lotus was reasonable because the French officer's negligence caused damage to a Turkish
ship, which is akin to Turkish territory; the assertion of jurisdiction thus fits into the principle that jurisdiction can be exercised
over "conduct outside the territory causing effect within."122 The
court's decision in the FisheriesCase was a reasonable solution to
the unusual coastline involved in that case, and the result has
been approved and codified in the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone1 23 and in the Draft Convention of UNCLOS M1.124

The theory that nations are free to do as they please, absent
some prohibitory rule, is inimical to the settlement of international disputes by law. "The moment the ultimate foundation of
State rights is found in State sovereignty, law suffers because the
rights in question tend to cancel out .... -125 Assertions of rights
by one nation of necessity often deny rights asserted by other nations. To place the burden of proof on one party to find a rule that
prohibited the conduct of another would reduce much of international law to procedural jockeying between the parties to become
plaintiff or defendant, whichever would avoid having the burden
of proof.126 As a practical matter, when asserted rights are in conflict and if the parties wish to resolve the conflict by legal procedures, the parties must drop the claim that they have a preexisting right to their positions, absent a prohibitory rule, and allow the dispute to be settled by the relevant rules of international
121. The judges were evenly split on the decision; the presiding judge cast a
second vote, deciding the case.
122. See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
95-115 (2d ed. 1981); Restatement of the ForeignRelations Law of the United States

§ 18(b) (iii) (1) (1965). The specific result in Lotus was nonetheless reversed by
treaty, in the Convention on the High Seas, supra note 27, art. 11.

123. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 28, art.
4.
124. Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 7.
125. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Proceduresof the InternationalCourt of Justice,
1951-54: General Principlesand Sources of Law, [1953] Brarr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 12.

126. Id.
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law. As Judge Alvarez commented in a concurring opinion in the
FisheriesCase:
It is also necessary to pay special attention to another principle which has
been much spoken ot the right of States to do everything which is not
expressly forbidden by international law. This principle, though formerly
correct, in the days2 7of absolute national sovereignty, is no longer so at the
present day ....

1

The use of the "absence of a prohibitory rule" theory assumes,
of course, that rules of international law do not presently regulate
seabed mining. The next section of this article will discuss the
evolution of international attitudes regarding the deep seabed
from the mid-1960's to the present to see if any of the attitudes
that have developed have risen to the level of legal obligations. In
looking at these developments, it is important to recognize the
primitive state of the law relevant to seabed mining as of the mid1960's. Many of the commentators arguing for the freedom of seabed mining speak of the events from the mid-1960's to the present
as efforts to change existing law. 2 8 The effort of this article up to
this point has been to show that the law of the seabed prior to the
mid-1960's was ambiguous and sparse. The events since the mid1960's cannot be seen as attempts to change existing law, but as
attempts to create law in a vacuum.
V.

A.

THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL OBUGATIONS,

1967-81

The Emergence of an InternationalConsensus

Ambassador Arvid Pardo's famous address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1967129 triggered international concern
over the legal status of the deep seabed. Pardo's speech and the
publication of "The Mineral Resources of the Sea '' 13o by John
Mero, describing vast seabed resources as perhaps easily exploited, made the deep seabed an important issue in international
law. While the issue of the deep seabed could be ignored in 1958,
by the late 1960's it had to be directly confronted.
Within three years of Pardo's initiative, the international community had reached broad agreement, at least on a policy level,
on several important principles concerning the seabed. The
127. The Fisheries Case, [1951] LCJ. Rep. at 152.

128. See, e.g., KRONmIER, supra note 24, at 207-345; Deepsea BrieA supra note
34 at 210.
129. U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
130. J. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCE OF THE SEA (1965).

agreements were symbolized by the "common heritage of mankind" language that came to be employed whenever the seabed
was discussed. Considerable disagreement still exists over both
the exact meaning of these principles concerning the seabed and
the legal authority of the documents in which these principles are
expressed. Nevertheless, the international community had
achieved an area of shared policy objectives regarding the deep
seabed by the early 1970's.
In 1969, the United Nations General Assembly passed the Moratorium Resolution, by a vote of 62 to 28, with 28 abstentions, declaring that States and corporations are "bound to refrain" from
seabed mining until an international regime can be established to
govern this activity.13 ' The following year, the members of the
General Assembly worked hard to hammer out a document that
could achieve a broader consensus. The result was an ambiguous
document, a negotiated compromise carefully worded to achieve
the broadest possible consensus, called the "Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction" (Declaration
of Principles).132 It was passed unanimously, by a vote of 108-0,
with only 14 nations from Eastern Europe including the Soviet
131. GA Res. 2574D (XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 11, U.N. Doc. A/
7630 (1969). The recorded vote was as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Burundi, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo
(Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Rwanda, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Against: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mongolia,
Neheriands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Africa,
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America.
Abstaining. Burma, China, Cuba, El Salvador, Greece, Indonesia, Iran,
Israel, Ivory Coast, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Nigeria, Philippines, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sudan,
Swaziland, Syria, Togo, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta.
Absent: Albania, Botswana, Cambodia, Cameroon, Equitorial Guinea,
Gabon, Gambia, Senegal
132. GAL Res. 2749 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970). The text of the Declaration:
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 2340 (XXII) of 18 December 1967, 2467 (XXIII)
of 21 December 1968 and 2574 (XXIV) of 15 December 1969, concerning the
area to which the title of the item refers,
Affirming that there is an area of the seabed and the ocean floor, and
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Union abstaining. Since the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union and the
the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, the precise
limits of which are yet to be determined,
Recognizing that the existing legal regime of the high seas does not provide substantive rules for regulating the exploration of the aforesaid area
and the exploitation of its resources,
Convinced that the area shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole,
Believing it essential that an international regime applying to the area
and its resources and including appropriate international machinery
should be established as soon as possible,
Bearing in mind that the development and use of the area and its resources shall be undertaken in such a manner as to foster the healthy development of the world economy and balanced growth of international
trade, and to minimize any adverse economic effects caused by the fluctuation of prices of raw materials resulting from such activities.
Solemnly declares that,
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as
the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by
States or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise
sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof
3. No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise or acquire rights with respect to the area or its resources incompatible with the
international regime to be established and the principles of this Declaration.
4. All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the area and other related activities shall be governed by the
international regime to be established.
5. The area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by
all States, whether coastal or land-locked, without discrimination, in accordance with the international regime to be established.
6. States shall act in the area in accordance with the applicable principles and rules of international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on 24
October 1970, in the interests of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding.
7. The exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources
shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of
the geographical location of States, whether land-locked or coastal, and
taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries.
8. The area shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, without prejudice to any measures which have been undertaken or may be
agreed upon in the context of international negotiations undertaken in the
field of disarmament and which may be applicable to a broader area. One
or more international agreements shall be concluded as soon as possible
in order to implement effectively this principle and to constitute a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof from the arms race.
9. On the basis of the principles of this Declaration, an international

other Eastern European nations have come to endorse the devel33
oping nations' interpretation of the Declaration of Principles.
The Declaration of Principles is not the sole authority for the
argument that legal principles developed since 1967 now regulate
the seabed, but it is an important piece of evidence. Because of
its importance, it is necessary to comment upon the legal effect of
United Nations resolutions in general before discussing the content of the Declaration of Principles and whether any of the principles therein now are law.
The United Nations General Assembly lacks formal legislative
competence. 3 4 Nevertheless, resolutions of the General Assembly have significance for the formation of international law in
three distinct ways. First, resolutions may serve as convenient
formulations of customary international law. Given the highly decentralized formation of customary law, resolutions that formalize
and express existing law can be tremendously useful. In this
sense, the resolutions do not add to the content of existing law;
35
they merely give it new expression.
Second, General Assembly resolutions, particularly those labeled "deelarations"1-6
may be considered to import, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong
expectation that Members of the international community will abide by it.
Consequently, insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State
practice, a declaration may13by
7 custom become recognized as laying down
rules binding upon States.

Resolutions may thus contribute to the development of new law
regime applying to the area and its resources and including appropriate
international machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be established
by an international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed upon.
The regime shall, inter alia, provide for the orderly and safe development
and rational management of the area and its resources and for expanding
opportunities in the use thereof and ensure the equitable sharing by
States in the benefits derived therefrom, taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries, whether landlocked or coastal.
[Paragraphs 10-15 have been omitted, they are not relevant to the present discussion.]
133. See note 20 supra.
134. See U.N. CHARTEP, arts. 10-17. A proposal to give the General Assembly
the power to make generally binding law was rejected at the San Francisco Conference on International Organization; only one nation voted in favor of the proposal. 13 U.N.C.LO. Doc. 754 (1945).
135. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary InternationalLaw, 73 Pnoc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 301 (1979).
136. No formal difference exists between a "declaration" and a 'resolution" of
the U.N. General Assembly, but in practical terms, a declaration may have more
political and moral force because of its "greater solemnity and significance." UN
Doc. E/CN. 4/L.610 (1962) (memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly.)
137. Id.
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by influencing the moral and political climate in which nations
operate.
Third, a General Assembly resolution may itself be an element
in the practice of nations which leads to the establishment of law.
The most important question, especially with respect to novel activities such as seabed mining, is the extent to which the process
of enacting a resolution may establish law when little other relevant State practice exists.
In arguing against giving much weight to United Nations resolutions, it is sometimes stated that nations "don't mean what they
say" in the United Nations;138 they do not regard their votes or
statements in the General Assembly as law-making, and hence,
cannot be bound as if they were. Nations often paper over real
differences by voting for ambiguous resolutions merely to avoid
politically embarrassing confrontations.139 (Similar compromises
also occur, of course, in domestic legislatures, where legislators
frequently vote for bills that they are not completely satisfied
with in order to further party goals.) The way to meet these objections, without capitulating to the cynicism they express, requires examining resolutions individually to find what meanings
enjoy genuine consensus and what perceptions of the legal effects
can fairly be attributed to the nations involved.
To conclude that, in some circumstances, the votes of nations at
the United Nations General Assembly may create international
law is consistent with the purpose of recognizing custom as a
source of law. "Uniformity of conduct and the process of 'reciprocal claims and mutual tolerances' often create expectations of
continuation of the same kinds of conduct. States and interested
entities, including private persons, develop their policies and plan
their actions on the basis of such expectations .. ."140 Accordingly, Lissitzyn concludes: "If such statements or declarations
emanate from a large number of States and purport to deal with a
legal matter, they may be regarded in some circumstances as indications of a general consensus amounting to a norm of general
international law."141
The use of outer space is a good example of nations claiming le138. Schwebel, supra note 135, at 302.
139. Id. at 302, 308-09.
140. 0. LissrrzyN, INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY AND ToMoRRow 34 (1965).

141. Id at 35-36.

gal significance for General Assembly resolutions purporting to
regulate novel activities for which little state practice exists. In
1963, for instance, the United States representative said: "When a
General Assembly resolution proclaimed principles of international law-as resolution 1721 (XV) had done-and was adopted
unanimously, it represented the law as generally accepted in the
international community."' 4 2
A recent arbitral award 143 may indicate a trend in the use of
United Nations General Assembly resolutions in international adjudications. The arbitrator held that certain provisions of the 1962
"Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources"14 4 were binding international law because (1) the Resolution had been supported by members of all of the geographical
groups and economic systems, and (2) nations expressed "universal recognition" of the principles involved at the time of
voting.145
Applying these criteria to the 1970 Declaration of Principles
seems to lead to the conclusion that it should be viewed as evidence of emerging customary law. This conclusion seems particularly logical as applied to the vote of the United States because
our leaders were speaking and acting during this period in support of the goals of the Declaration of Principles.
For instance, in the first major policy statement regarding the
deep seabed, in 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson said:
[U]nder no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospects
of rich harvest and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to
grab and to hold the lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the
deep seas and the ocean bottoms, are, and remain, the legacy of all human
142. U.N. Doc. A/A.C.105/C.2/SR. 20 at 10-11 (1963) (remarks of United States
representative Meeker.)
143. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and CaliforniaAsiatic Oil Company
v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 IT'rL LEGAL MATERIALS 1

(1978) (Rene-Jean Dupuy, sole arbitrator).
144. GA. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR (Supp. 17) 15-16 (1962).
145. 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1, 27 (1978). In the course of his opinion, the Arbitrator, Rene-Jean Dupuy (Secretary General of the Hague Academy of International Law and Professor of Law at the University of Nice), stated:
[I] t is impossible to deny that the United Nations' activities have had a
significant influence on the content of contemporary international law. In
appraising the legal validity of the above-mentioned Resolutions, this Tribunal will take account of the criteria usually taken into consideration,
i.e., the examination of voting conditions and the analysis of the provisions concerned.
Id. at 28.
Using these same criteria, the Arbitrator concluded that the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, GA. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR (Supp. 31) 50
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beings. 146

Then, in 1970, President Richard M. Nixon announced a new
oceans policy that included the renunciation of all sovereign
rights to the seabed and its resources and the establishment of international machinery to administer the licensing of exploration
and exploitation of the resources of the seabed. 47 Among the
"Basic Principles" announced by President Nixon to govern the
seabed were the following three:
The International Seabed Area would be the common heritageof mankind
and no state could exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over this area
or its resources or, except as provided in the convention, acquire any right
or interest therein.
The International Seabed Area would be open to use by all states without
discrimination, except as otherwise provided in the convention, and would
be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Provision would be made for the collection of revenues from mineral production in the Area to be used for internationalcommunity purposes including economic advancement of developing countries and for promotion
of the safe, efficient and economic exploitation of the mineral resources of
the seabed (emphasis added). 148

President Nixon, followed by President Gerald Ford and President Jimmy Carter, entered into active negotiations at the United
Nations preparatory meetings and at UNCLOS I to develop a
treaty that would create an international regime to govern seabed
mining consistent with the Declaration of Principles. At no time
did our negotiators express any reservations about these Principles. Many of the most significant initiatives came from the
United States, including in particular. the Kissinger compromise
of 1976, proposing the parallel system of exploitation coupled with
indications that the developed world would finance the Enterprise
and provide the technology for its operations 49 and the many refinements negotiated by Elliot Richardson in 1979 and 1980 to
(1974), did not represent customary international law because of the strong dissents registered by those nations voting against it.
146. Address by President Lyndon Johnson at Commissioning of Ship Oceanographer, July 13, 1966 (cited in E. WENK, THE POLCS

OF THE OCEAN

258

(1972)).
147. Summary of Provisions of Draft Proposed by the United States for a
"United Nations Convention on the InternationalSea Bed Area,"August 3,1970, 65
Am.J. brr'LL. 179 (1971).

148. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
149. See 75 DEP'r STATE BuLL.395 (1976); Oxman, The Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Session, 72 Am J. INT'L L.
247, 254 (1977).

make the governing bodies of the International Seabed Authority
more acceptable to the United States.150
The Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act of 1980151 specifically acknowledges the commitment of the United States to
the 1970 Declaration of Principles. Sections 2(a) (3) and (4) of the
1980 Act state:
(3) [O]n December 17, 1970, the United States supported (by affirmative
vote) the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) de150. See generally Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 11-19 (1980).
The extreme nature of the current "reassessment" being undertaken by the
Reagan administration can be demonstrated by comparing the "concerns" identified by Ambassador Malone, supra note 10, with earlier American statements and
with earlier declarations supported by the United States. In nearly all cases, the
"9concerns" involve issues long agreed upon in principle; only the implementation
needed to be negotiated.
A. Compare 'The Draft Convention places under burdensome international
regulation the development of all of the resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction... ," Malone, supra note 10, at 4, with
"4. All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the
area and other related activities shall be governed by the international regime to
be established... 9: [A]n international regime applying to the area and its resources and including appropriate international machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be established by an international treaty .... " 1970 Declaration of
Principles, supra note 132.
B. Compare 'The Draft Convention would establish a supranational mining
company, called the Enterprise... the Draft Convention requires the U.S. and
The Enterother nations to fund the initial capitalization of the Enterprise ....
prise, through mandatory transfer, is guaranteed access on request to seabed mining technology owned by private companies ...

" Malone, supra note 10, at 5,

with
[T~he United States would be prepared to agree to a means of financing
the Enterprise in such a manner that the Enterprise could begin its mining operation either concurrently with the mining of State or private enterprises or within an agreed timespan that was practically concurrent
[T] his would include agreed provisions for the transfer of technology
...
so that the existing advantage of certain industrial states would be equalized over a period of time.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 75 DEPr. STATE BuL. 395, 398 (remarks of
Kissinger at reception for heads of delegations to UNCLOS III, Sept. 1, 1976).
C. Compare 'The Draft Convention limits the annual production of manganese
nodules from the deep seabed. .. ," Malone, supra note 10, at 3, with 'The United
States is prepared to accept a temporary limitation, for a period fixed in the treaty,
on production of seabed minerals tied to the projected growth in the world nickel
market... ," Address by Henry Kissinger, entitled The Law of the Sea: A Test of
InternationalCooperation, (Apr. 8, 1976), cited in Herman, The Niceties of NickelCanadaand the ProductionCeiling Issue at the Law of the Sea Conference, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 265, 276 (1979).
D. Compare 'The Draft Convention imposes revenue-sharing obligations on
seabed mining corporations which would significantly increase the cost of seabed
mining, Malone, supra note 10, at 7, with 'The regime should provide for the collection of substantial mineral royalties to be used for international community
purposes . . . ," President Nixon, United States Policy for the Seabed, May 1970,
cited in E. WENK, supra note 146, at 485-86, and "[T] he treaty's financial provisions
are not worse than most other tax systems." Elliot Richardson, DEP'T STATE, BuREAU OF PUB. AFF., Current Policy No. 233, Seabed Mining and the Law of the Sea
3 (address by Elliot Richardson, Sept. 9, 1980).
151. See Deep Seabed Act, supra note 18.
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daring inter alia the principle that the mineral resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of mankind, with the expectation that this
principle would be legally defined under the terms of a comprehensive international Law of the Sea Treaty yet to be agreed upon;
(4) [I]t is in the national interest of the United States and other nations
to encourage a widely acceptable Law of the Sea Treaty, which will provide a new legal order for the oceans covering a broad range of ocean interests, including exploration for
152 and commercial recovery of hard mineral
resources of the deep seabed.

Although the United States and other nations universally have
endorsed the principle that the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction is "the common heritage of mankind,"153 it is often argued that the "common heritage" principle lacks enough
specificity to import legal obligations. 5 4 It is true that the words
"common heritage" and their accompanying concept are not sufficiently detailed to create a seabed regime. The regime must be
more fully defined by the current negotiations. But the principle
of the "common heritage" does limit the kinds of actions that are
currently permissible in the deep seabed.
Nations have agreed in the Declaration of Principles that the
deep seabed is presently the common heritage of humankind.155
Although a comprehensive law of the sea treaty is necessary to
implement the principle, a new treaty is not necessary to confirm
the present status of the deep seabed as the common heritage.
Nations have some freedom to negotiate what the common heritage means and its legal significance, but they cannot deny that
the seabed is the common heritage of humankind. Nations have
also agreed that they must implement the principle of the common heritage during the current United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea. It was an explicit purpose of the Declaration
of Principles to serve as the basis for negotiating the future seabed regime.156
The analysis in this section157 presents the justifications for giving legal significance to aspects of the Declaration of Principles
and the seabed's "common heritage." The Declaration was universally endorsed at the time of its adoption. The best approach
to giving definite content to the "common heritage of mankind"
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
See notes 132, 148, &152 and accompanying text supra.
Murphy, supra note 32, at 540; T. KRoNozLuR, supra note 24, at 339-40.
Declaration of Principles, supra note 132.
Id. operative paragraph 9; see note 158 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 134-45 and accompanying text supra.

was proposed by the United States Representative John Stevenson when he explained the vote of the United States in favor of
the Declaration of Principles: the meaning of the "common heritage" "is indicated by the principles which follow" it in the Declaration "and will be elaborated in the internationally agreed
regime to be established."158
With this procedure in mind, several principles which follow
the "common heritage" concept in the Declaration of Principles
can now be further discussed. These principles regarding the seabed have been established as law by virtue of their universal recognition by all major nations in the Declaration of Principles and
by other actions of nations in the last fifteen years. The three basic principles discussed below do not exhaust the legal obligations that flow from the events of the last fifteen years, but they
have been selected because they are especially relevant to the
current United States reappraisal of the law of the sea negotiations. The principles are as follows: (1) the "common heritage"
concept requires that developing nations share genuine benefits
from seabed exploitation; (2) a "generally accepted" law of the
sea treaty can establish a seabed regime binding even on nonparties to the treaty; and (3) even if no treaty is signed, claims of exclusive rights to seabed resources will be prohibited.
B. Developing CountriesMust Enjoy Genuine Benefitsfrom
Seabed Exploitation
The seventh operative paragraph of the 1970 Declaration of
Principles provides:
7. The exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources shall
be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the
geographical location of States, whether land-locked or coastal, and taking
into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing
countries.159

The ninth operative paragraph, which outlines the basic conditions of the international regime to be negotiated for the seabed,
repeats this obligation:
The regime shall, inter alia, provide for the orderly and safe development
and rational management of the area and its resources and for expanding
opportunities in the use thereof and ensure the equitable sharing by
States in the benefits derived therefrom, taking into particularconsideration the interests160
and needs of the developing countries, whether landlocked or coastal.

The United States interpreted paragraph 7 to mean: "that no
158. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1799 at 3 (1970) (statement of United States representative John Stevenson).
159. See note 132 supra (emphasis added).
160. Id. (emphasis added).
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State or group of States, be they landlocked or coastal, developed
or developing, may receive all of the benefits from the area or any
part of it. More than any other principle, it is this one which elevates the interests of the international community above all
others.... ."161 The members of the United Nations clearly
agreed in the Declaration of Principles that all nations, especially
the developing countries, should share in the benefits of seabed
exploitation and that the future international regime governing
the seabed is 2required to take positive steps to ensure this equita6
ble sharing.
Economic analysis gives a more specific meaning to the provisions of the Declaration of Principles. Seabed mining, if successful, will increase supplies and decrease prices of the metals to be
extracted from the seabed, thus helping consumers of these metals. But competition from seabed mining will hurt terrestrial producers of the metals in two ways: by lowering prices of the
metals derived from mines, and by redirecting investments that
would otherwise be made to expand production from terrestrial
mines.
The magnitude of these effects is highly speculative, depending
upon a host of factors. One common conclusion can be drawn
from the studies that have considered the effects upon developing
countries: seabed mining, restrained only by market forces,
would cost developing country producers of the metals more than
it would benefit developing country consumers. 63 The underly161. U.N. Doe. A/C.1/PV. 1799 at 3 (1970) (statement of United States representative John Stevenson).
162. See operative paragraph 9 of the Declaration of Principles, supra note 132.
163. The economic effect of seabed mining depends first upon the size that the
industry will reach. Even a small seabed mining industry would supply significant
amounts of cobalt, and it is generally conceded that seabed production will depress the price of cobalt. Zaire is currently the major producer of cobalt. Should
manganese be extracted, seabed production will quickly play a major role in world
manganese markets as well. The following table shows the proportion of the current world demand for each metal that would be supplied by a single "typical" 3million ton/year nodule operation producing nickel, copper, manganese, and
cobalt:
Nickel .............................. 4.9%
Copper .............................. 0.44%
Manganese ......................... 7.9%
Cobalt ............................... 16.2%
Projections of the economic effect of seabed mining on developing countries
support the conclusion reached in the text that seabed mining, restrained only by
market forces, would hurt developing countries more than it would benefit them,
but they differ on the magnitude of the effects. I. BULxLEY, WHo GAINS FOR DEEP

ing reason is simple: the developing countries produce far more
of the metals involved than they consume, and they are likely to
continue doing so for a long time. Nickel and cobalt, especially,
are high-technology materials, little used by developing countries.16 4 In addition, most expansion in nickel production on land
is likely to occur in developing countries.165
These general economic realities of seabed mining should have
been clear to all concerned since the late 1960's. The developed
countries, through the 1970 Declaration of Principles and other
resolutions, accepted responsibility for trying to mitigate the predicted adverse effects upon developing countries. For example, a
companion resolution to the Declaration of Principles, which was
also adopted unanimously, contains this provision:
Reaffirming that the development of the area and its resources shall be
undertaken in such a manner as to foster the healthy development of the
world economy and balanced growth of international trade, and to minimize any adverse economic effects caused by the fluctuation of prices of
raw materials resultingfrom such activities.. 166 (emphasis added).

The Declaration of Principles does not require any specific
method for reducing these adverse effects. The United States
took particular care to insist that the Declaration of Principles did
not prejudice the question of production controls to be subsequently negotiated in the treaty.167 Some action is, however, necessary to ensure the sharing of benefits.
The United States has consistently agreed to share revenues
OCEAN MINING? 61 (1979): "If no new regime to govern ocean mining is negotiated,
the simulation shows that not only will ihe [more developed countries] capture
the whole of the 'common heritage,' but will in addition secure a redistribution of
world income toward themselves." This economic simulation showed that in an
unregulated free-access regime, the developing countries suffered a net loss of income. Accord, Economic Implications of Sea-Bed Mining in the International
Area: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/37 at 1126 (1975).
One study, Johnston, The Economics of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 13
MARINE TECH. Soc'y J. 6:26, 28 (1979), shows gains to developing-country consumers from seabed mining exceeding losses to developing-country producers by the
year 2010, but it uses the untenable assumption that the tonnage of nickel produced by developing countries will not increase, and their share of the world's
nickel supply will decrease from 13% in 1980 to 4% in 2010. In fact, most new capital investment in nickel production is being made in developing countries, Mining
Investment 1980, 181 ENGINEERING MINING J. 75, 85-86 (1980), and about 37% of the
world's identified reserves are in developing countries (even if one includes the
extensive reserves in French-held New Caledonia among the developed country
reserves). N. MATrEws, NICKEL 6 (1979).
164. N. MAITHEwS, supra note 163, at 4-6.
165. See note 163 supra.
166. GA. Res. 2750 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) 25, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) (emphasis added).
167. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1799 at 3 (1970) (statement of United States representative John Stevenson).
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from the seabed with the international community.168 Although
these offers by the United States to share revenues from deep
seabed mining have not expressly acknowledged that such sharing is required by international law, the context of the remarks
strongly suggests that conclusion. For example, in his major policy statement on the seabed beyond national jurisdiction in 1970,
President Nixon said that the future law of the sea treaty should
"establish an international regime for the exploitation of seabed
resources beyond this limit [200 meters]. The regime should provide for the collection of substantial mineral royalties to be used
for international community purposes ....
,"169 The use of the
term "royalties," which is a term "historically derived from the
right of a sovereign or other proprietor to compensation for the
taking of minerals that he owns,"' 7 0 indicates that the international community has some property rights to the deep seabed
and that the sharing of revenues from the deep seabed is not
merely an act of generosity by the exploiting nation.
The 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act'71 includes
a revenue-sharing fund, created by imposing a special tax on seabed miners of 0.75% of the processed value of the metals.172
Should a law of the sea treaty be ratified by the United States, the
money in the trust fund will be available to cover contributions
required by the treaty. 73 If no treaty takes effect with respect to
the United States by June 1990, "amounts in the Trust Fund shall
be available for such purposes as Congress may hereafter provide
by law."'17 4
It is unlikely that developing countries will be impressed by the
trust fund contained in the Act. The United States negotiating
team has previously proposed during the UNCLOS III negotiations that a royalty of 2-4% of the value of the processed metals
be imposed on seabed miners, and the latest negotiating text im168. See, e.g., Deep Seabed Act, supra note 18, subchapter F; Statement by
President Nixon, supra note 150; note 150 and accompanying text supra.
169. United States Policyfor the Seabed, supra note 168.
170. Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed. Hearing on H.R. 11879 Before the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 140-41 (1976)

(statement of Northcutt Ely).
171. See notes 18 and 21 supra.
172. 30 U.S.C. § 1472(a) (1980).
173. Id. § 403.

174. Id. § 403(2) (e).

poses a royalty of 5-12%.175 The difference between the royalties
proposed at the Conference and the 0.75% in the United States
Deep Seabed Act could be considerable. For a typical project,
0.75% of the gross revenues would amount to about $1.9 million;
the 2-4% proposed by United States negotiators would generate
$5.2 to $10.3 million; and the 5-12% of the Draft Convention would
generate $12.9 to $31 million.I7 6
Many members of Congress, including Senators McClure, Byrd,
Stevens, and Long, and Representatives Murphy and Breaux,
have bitterly attacked the various drafts for a law of the sea treaty
for being too imbalanced in favor of the developing countries with
respect to the seabed provisions. 77 These congressional critics
ignore the problem that because the seabed has been agreed to
be a shared resource, a seabed mining regime must contain major
safeguards and advantages to the developing countries.
The inherent economics of the situation assure that a free-access, "freedom of the seas" regime will benefit only those developed countries which have the technology to mine the seabed and
which consume large amounts of the metals found therein and
will hurt the developing countries which rely on mineral exports. 178 That the future regime of the seabed cannot permit this
situation was conceded long ago by the United States: "no group
of States ... may receive all of the benefits from the
179 Revenue sharing, production controls, commodity
area ....,,
agreements, and technology transfer' 8 0 are all potential methods
to achieve the goals required by the "common heritage" principle.
175. Two systems of payments are contained in the draft treaty. Each is
designed to produce the same amount of revenue from a moderately successful
seabed mining project, like the "baseline" case in MIT MODEL, supra note 69. The
straight royalty system imposes payments of 5% of the value of the processed
metals for ten years, increasing to 12% of the value after ten years. The other system combines royalty payments with a share of the net income of the miner.
The French statute requires French mining companies to contribute 3.75 percent
of the value of the minerals they extract to developing countries. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 17, 1981, at AS, col. 5.
176. The calculations of royalty payments are based on the AMT "baseline"
model, which has revenues of $258 million per year. Because the prices of the relevant metals have increased about 50% since the MI study was done in 1976, the
royalties would probably be higher. MIT MODEL, supra note 69.
177. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. S18510-64 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1979); Murphy, supra
note 32.
178. See notes 163-65 and accompanying text supra.
179. See note 161 and accompanying text supra.
180. Among the provisions of earlier drafts of the Draft Convention most severely criticized by private seabed mining interests have been those designed to
favor the interests of developing countries, including mandatory technology transfer to the Enterprise, production controls limiting seabed production to a specified
portion of the growth in the world's nickel market, and the potential for commodity agreements to stabilize the price of metals derived from the seabed.

534

[VOL. 19: 493, 1982]

Governing the Seabed
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

C. A "GenerallyAccepted" Law of the Sea Treaty Will Bind
Nonparties
Burton has argued that even if a comprehensive law of the sea
treaty governing seabed mining is adopted, nations that are not
parties to the treaty will be free to mine the seabed.18' Nordquist
has suggested that nonparties might offer themselves as 'flags of
convenience" to seabed miners who wish to escape the provisions
of the treaty.182 It is certainly possible that the United States may
refuse to become a party to a treaty that is accepted by most of
the rest of the world.183 It is also possible that even if the United
States and most of the world's nations conclude a comprehensive
treaty governing seabed mining, some nation capable of developing a seabed mining operation will not become a party. How
would a claim fare by the United States or some other non-ratifying country of a right to mine the seabed independently of a
treaty regime?
For a nonparty country to hold that it has a right to mine the
seabed, it must either argue that some positive rule of international law, such as the "freedom of the seas," 8 4 allows it to mine
the seabed, or use the argument that what is not prohibited, is
permitted. 8 5 Both of these arguments would be further weakened by the establishment of an international regime, accepted by
a large number of nations, which purported to govern seabed mining. But the question must eventually turn on the general power
of a treaty to make law affecting nonparties.
Although the general rule in international law is that treaties
181. Burton, supra note 24, at 1178 n.180. "There is no precedent that would
make a treaty obligation to do business with an international organization binding
on states not party to the constituent instrument of the organization. Though
political pressures to deal with such an organization may be considerable, it is
doubtful that states will see such a legal obligation as anything but an infringement of their sovereignty."
182. Nordquist, Deep Seabed Mining: Who Should Pay?,12 MAINE TEcH. Soc'y
J. (No. 2) 23 (1978).
183. The President of the Conference, Tommy Koh, has stated that if the
United States does not go ahead with the negotiations after its current policy review, 'There is little doubt.., that the developing nations and the East block
would finalize their own treaty." Honolulu Advertiser, May 2, 1981, at 13, col 4.
The current negotiating text, supra note 6, forbids nonparties from exploiting the
seabed by requiring all who wish to exploit the seabed to obtain permission of the
ISA, id. art. 137, and forbidding the ISA from giving permits to miners not sponsored by nations party to the treaty, id. art. 153.
184. See notes 27-39 and 60-81 and accompaying text supra.
185. See notes 117-28 and accompanying text supra.

bind only the countries that ratify them, some treaties have had a
universal "constitutive" effect, binding on all nations; the prime
example is a treaty "which bring[s] into existence some new international entity, whether a State or not."186 A Law of the Sea
Convention could have a "constitutive" effect in that nonparties
could be forced to recognize the international legal personality of
87
the International Seabed Authority established by the treaty.
But a further basis must be found in order to require that nonparties abide by the Convention's rules governing seabed mining.
The treaty, once enacted, will purport to forbid deep seabed exploitation by nonparties to the treaty.188 This claim to universal
effect accords with the mandate given the Conference in the Declaration of Principles. The nations participating in the 1970 Declaration of Principles' 8 9 clearly intended that the future treaty
should lay out seabed laws binding on all nations. This universal
coverage was especially important to the developed nations. The
proposed treaty could not guarantee them the exclusive use of
mine sites if nonparties were free to operate as they pleased on
the seabed.190
The Declaration of Principles states, in part: "3. No State or
person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise or acquire rights
with respect to the area or its resources incompatible with the international regime to be established and the principles of this
Declaration."1 91 This provision must be read in conjunction with
the requirement that the future regime "be established by an international treaty of universal character, generally agreed
upon ....

'192 These provisions are of limited importance prior to

the establishment of a treaty, because it is difficult to know what
will be "incompatible with the international regime to be estabiished."' 93 It is clear, however, that the nations participating in
the Declaration of Principles have promised to respect the inter186. A.McNAm, supra note 36, at 268; see also J. BRIERLY, THE LAW
326-27 (6th ed. 1963).

OF NATIONS,

187. Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the

United Nations, [1949] LCJ. 174.
188. See note 183 supra.
189. See note 132 supra.
190. See notes 200-36 and accompanying text infra.
191. See note 132 supra.
192. GA Res. 2749 (XXV), operative paragraph 9, supra note 132.
193. The language of paragraph 3 had to be vague in order to achieve consensus. Both the developing nations and the United States were thinking of the interim period prior to the establishment of a treaty foremost in drafting this
paragraph. Neither side wanted to prejudice the future regime with claims in the
interim. The developing countries believed interim seabed mining to be inconsistent with the future regime, but the United States did not. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.1/
P.V. 1799, at 3 (statement of United States representative John Stevenson).
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national regime, once it is in place.'9
The difficulty that is likely to arise in giving universal effect to
the seabed provisions of a treaty is that such a power can be attributed only to a treaty that is, in the terms of the Declaration of
Principles, "generally agreed upon." 9 5 If some major nations do
not agree to the treaty, they will surely assert that it is not generally accepted law. This problem was recognized to some extent in
the debates over the Declaration of Principles. United States representative John Stevenson stated that the future seabed regime
must not result from "an agreement from a few states in a region,
or in one group or another." 9 6 The United Kingdom's representative said that the future regime "should command the acceptance
of the great majority in order to insure its effectiveness."1 97
Following the logic of the recent Libyan arbitral award,198 if a
treaty follows the policies agreed upon in the 1970 Declaration of
Principles, and if it enjoys support from each of the major political, economic, and geographical groups, the regime it creates
should be held to control the use of the seabed by all nations. It
is impossible to specify the degree of disagreement that will prevent the international seabed regime from claiming universal effect. But no single nation, not even one as powerful as the United
States, can block the creation of international law.199 If the
United States stands alone in opposing the treaty and engages in
seabed mining outside of a treaty regime that is generally agreed
upon, these activities will be held unlawful.
194. Even if the Declaration of Principles is not accepted as expressing customary international law, the votes taken by nations in support of it might estop them
from denying the application of consequences flowing directly from the Declaration such as, for example, that a seabed regime established by general agreement
can control the deep seabed completely. Accord, Higgins, The Development of InternationalLaw by the PoliticalOrgans of the U.N., in 59mi Pnoc. Am.Soc'y INT'L
L. 116, 122 (1965) (estoppel may arise from votes on U.N. General Assembly
resolutions).
195. Declaration of Principles, operative paragraph 9, supra note 132.
196. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1799, at 3 (statement of United States representative
John Stevenson).
197. Id. at 2 (statement of United Kingdom representative).
198. See notes 143-45 and accompanying text supra.
199. Contemporary Views on the Sources of InternationalLaw: The Effect of
U.N. Resolutions on Emerging Legal Norms, in 73RD PRoc. Am.Soc'y INT'L L 300,
332 (1979) (remarks of Prof. Myres McDougal on the role of the great powers in
creating customary international law). See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
711 (1900), quoting Justice Strong in The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871):
"Undoubtedly no single nation can change the law of the sea."

D. If UNCLOS III Does Not Produce a "GenerallyAccepted"
Treaty, Nations Cannot Claim the Exclusive Use of
Mine Sites
If the negotiations of UNCLOS III do not result in a treaty acceptable to countries with the technology to mine the seabed,
some of these countries, including the United States, will almost
certainly proceed with seabed mining under domestic legislation.200 The seabed miners will then want assurances that they
will have the exclusive use of a particular mine site.20 1
It will be shown that such exclusive use cannot lawfully be
claimed under the legal regime likely to exist after a failure of
UNCLOS HI.202 Reciprocating States agreements, suggested as
an alternative to the treaty that might give adequate security for
seabed miners, have serious potential for creating international
conflict. 203 Also, an alternative legal regime for the seabed that
would allow exclusive claims is unworkable and contrary to legal
authority.204 Finally, nations may take advantage of the ill-defined limits to national jurisdiction in the ocean to make extensive
claims to polymetallic nodule resources "adjacent" to their territory.2 05 The practical importance of the "exclusive use" issue and
the difficulty of achieving it under a '"reedom of the high seas" regime may create a continuing strain on established freedoms of
the seas.
Two lines of analysis lead to the conclusion that exclusive
claims to mine sites will be unlawful even if UNCLOS I fails.
The first is that the "common heritage" principle, as described in
the 1970 Declaration of Principles and other associated United Nations General Assembly resolutions, 2 06 should now be considered
a principle of customary international law, which prohibits claims
of exclusive jurisdiction. Several unanimous resolutions declare
200. According to at least some members of Congress, the "interim" Deep Seabed Act, supra note 18, was a signal of dissatisfaction with UNCLOS III and a
warning that the United States could "go it alone." See, e.g., 125 CoNG. REC.
S18510-64 (daffy ed. Dec. 14, 1979).
201. Prior to making serious investments in deepsea mining, a potential miner
needs to know it will have access to a deposit of sufficient size. See note 70 supra.
Mining and processing equipment must be tailored to a particular site, so the
miner needs to choose its site before making major outlays for equipment. Flipse,
Dubs & Greenwald, supra note 70.
202. See notes 206-36 and accompanying text infra.

203. See notes 237-64 and accompanying text infra.
204. See notes 221-36, 239-244 and accompanying text infra.

205. See notes 254-64 and accompanying text infra.
206. Declaration of Principles, supra note 132; Peaceful Uses of the Seabed,
G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII), 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 14, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1976);

Establishment of a Standing Seabed Committee, GA. Res. 2467A (XXIII), 23 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 15, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
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that national sovereignty cannot be indefinitely extended into the
deep seabed and that exclusive rights to areas of the deep seabed
20 7
may not be claimed.
Although it might be argued that General Assembly resolutions
alone cannot prohibit sovereign claims, the failure of any country
to assert that it has such a right operates as an implicit acquiescence to the prohibition. For example, although many developed
208
nations strongly objected to the 1969 Moratorium Resolution,
the United States and other dissenting nations did not claim that
they could establish exclusive rights to any seabed area; they
merely asserted a nonexclusive high seas freedom to explore and
exploit polymetallic nodules. 209 In all of the endless debates concerning the legality of interim seabed mining, including the discussions held at the many sessions of UNCLOS DI, no country
has ever argued that it has a right to establish exclusive claims.
In the words of one long-time observer (who was also a United
States representative at the Conference):
Given the sharp disagreements expressed [over the legality of seabed
mining prior to a treaty,] it is important to stress what was not contested.
No state argued that it could confer a right on its nationals to mine a specific site that would be exclusive ergo omnes. No state argued that it
would have the right to stop mining by another state at a mine site without the latter's consent; indeed, the United States expressly affirmed "the
exclusive jurisdiction of States over their ships and nationals" as one of
the applicable restraints of existing international law. In brief no state asserted a right to claim a part-even a reasonablepart-ofthe deep seabeds
or the resources of the deep seabeds to the exclusion of others pending a
treaty, or to 2the
exclusion of a treaty. There was no question of a
10
appropriation.

The 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act 21 ' similarly does not
assert that the granting of permission by the United States to explore or exploit designated areas of the seabed or the investment
therein or the working of the area by the permittee creates exclusive legal rights. In fact, the Act contains several express disclaimers of sovereignty or exclusive rights. For example, section
3(a) (2) provides: "[The United States] does not thereby assert
sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdictionover, or the ownership
207. See resolutions listed in note 206 supra.
208. See note 131 supra.
209. Saffo, supra note 24, at 512.
210. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Seventh Session (1978), 73 Am.J. INT'L L. 1, 33 (emphasis added).
211. See note 18 supra.

of,any areasor resources in the deep seabed "212 The Act forbids
United States citizens from interfering with the permittee, but
that prohibition is simply an exercise of national jurisdiction over
its own citizens. Ample evidence exists in the legislative history
of the Act to demonstrate that the disclaimer of sovereignty and
exclusive rights was made, not as a matter of political comity or
213
expediency, but out of a sense of legal obligation.m
Although the failure of UNCLOS III will arguably rob the "common heritage" principle of some of its effect, another source of
law prohibiting exclusive claims will probably be bolstered by the
absence of a seabed treaty. The United States and the other nations that proceed with seabed mining will almost certainly do so
under the theory that seabed mining is a freedom of the high
seas. 214 In their dealings with each other, these nations will probably establish a "reciprocating States" regime that adheres to
specified rules governing the regime of the high seas.2 15 In time
they may establish a custom, hitherto absent,216 that seabed mining should be treated by all nations as a freedom of the high seas.
Under such a regime of the high seas, no nation could claim sovereignty over any part of the high seas. 217 The prohibition would
extend to all claims of exclusive rights, even those that fall short
218
of full sovereignty.
It has been suggested that the exclusive use of a mine site can
be justified under a regime of the high seas as a "reasonable use":
that "[iJf mining is reasonable, then exclusive access to a site is
reasonable." 219 The argument is that a nation (Nation B) that
tried to mine in a site previously claimed by another (Nation A)
would have failed to pay a reasonable regard to the interests of
the original claimant (Nation A). Under the "reasonable regard"
duty, the nation originally claiming the site (Nation A) could not
act directly to exclude Nation B; it would have to resort to international diplomacy or adjudication to persuade the other to honor
212. Deep Seabed Act § 3(a) (2), supra note 18 (emphasis added).
213. See, e.g., Deep Seabed Mining, HR. REP. No. 96-411, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46
(1979): "No nation has the right to assert sovereignty or any form of sovereign jurisdiction or ownership over any area or in situ resources of the seabed."
214. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra (recent assertions by the
United States that deep seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas).
215. See Deep Seabed Act, supra note 18, § 118, especially § 118(a) (4), stating
that the reciprocating-states regime must not "unreasonably interfere with the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedoms of the high seas as recognized under general principles of international law" (emphasis added).
216. See notes 27-39, 60-85 and accompanying text supra.
217. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 27, art. 2.
218. Id.
219. Nyhart, The Interplay of Law and Technology in Deep Seabed Mining Issues, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 827, 865 (1975).
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its duty.22 o It would be extraordinary, however, to extend the
"reasonable regard" duty, which governs, for example, rules of
the road at sea, to hold that Nation B would be unreasonably interfering with Nation A, whose own mining activities might still
be proceeding in another part of the claimed site, a hundred miles
away.
For Nation A to claim exclusive rights to an entire site, it would
have to argue that because it (or its citizens) must have exclusive
rights to receive an adequate return on the large sums invested
on seabed mining at a particular site, any exploitation of any part
of the site by Nation B is an "unreasonable" interference. This
argument cannot be accepted, because it could just as easily apply to a particular high seas fishery or to a particular trade route
on the high seas. A nation cannot claim exclusive rights to a
stock of fish on the high seas simply because it has made major
investments in fishing equipment that it cannot recoup without
having exclusive use of the fishery. Nor can a country develop a
new trading route on the high seas and claim the exclusive right
to use such a route because it needs a monopoly to make a profit.
Nations do not have a high seas duty to ensure that the operations of others are profitable.
Ely and Goldie221 have attempted to reconcile exclusive mine
sites with a regime of the high seas by using a variant of the old
res nullius arguments. 222 They argue that although seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas, the polymetallic nodules are in a
state of res nullius and belong to the first one possessing them.
The analogy is made to fishing on the high seas: everyone is free
to fish; but once captured, the fish belong exclusively to the person who captures them.2 23
The difficulty with this analogy is that seabed miners seek exclusive rights 2to4 nodules long before they are captured by the
mining device. 2 The res nullius theorists answer that nodules in
situ can be "constructively possessed" prior to their actual capture.= What kinds of activities are necessary for "constructive
220. Burton, supra note 24, at 1171 n.161.
221. Deepsea Brief, supra note 34; Goldie, A General InternationalLaw Doctrinefor Seabed Regimes, 7 NTh'L
LAW 796 (1973).
222. This argument is analyzed in the text at notes 89-116 supra.
223. Goldie (1973), supra note 24, at 797.
224. See note 233-36 and accompanying text infra.
225. Deepsea Brief, supra note 34, at 202 ("occupation" is sometimes used instead of "constructive possession").

possession"? In 1979, Goldie said simply: "In the context of deep
ocean mining, the taking of the first nodule from the claimed ore
body in an equitably acceptable and determinate area, should be
deemed to establish possession over all the nodules within that
area." 226 In an article written six years earlier, Goldie used this
language but also appeared to lay down more stringent
requirements:
[Ilt can reasonably be argued that when an ocean bed resource of hard
minerals has been developed and is being worked, the developing enterprise establishes, by that activity, a valid claim of right to an area
equivalent to a tract on dry land, which provides an equitable return and
feasibility, but which is
no more, in terms of technological and economic
227
not so extensive as to create a monopoly.

The first difficulty with accepting the concept of "constructive
possession" over polymetallic nodules is that most of the cases
cited in its support involve jurisdiction over unclaimed territory
or resources on land, which is subject to entirely different rules
than the high seas. 22 8 The jurists in those terrestrial cases did not
have to reconcile exclusive possession with the longstanding high
seas tradition of free access. The few cases cited from ocean law
concern struck whales which later escape and are claimed by the
harpooning boat229 and the salvage of wrecks on the bottom of the
high seas. 230 Neither example of "constructive possession" would
support a claim to an expanse of seabed twice the size of Maryland, for example.
Serious practical problems exist with applying the concept of
"constructive possession" to claims to areas of the seabed. The
first problem is delimiting the size of the area "constructively possessed." Any "deposit" of nodules is really a series of discontinuous patches of nodules, perhaps stretching for hundreds of miles
and without discrete geological boundaries. A "deposit" cannot
practically be confined to a 50,000 square kilometer area; in most
cases, the same geological forces have created nodules found over
a much wider area. The asserted right to claim "constructive possession" of a "deposit" is really nothing more than a claimed right
226. Goldie, Customary InternationalLaw and Deep Seabed Mining, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L & COM.173, 174 n.3 (1979).
227. Goldie, (1973) supra note 24 at 812, cited with approval in Deepsea Brief,
supra note 34, at 209.
228. Goldie, (1973) supra note 24 cites, inter alia, mining claims on Spitzbergen
Island, id. at 807-815, and Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878) (miner's rights in the
American West). Deepsea Brietf supra note 34, at 202-05, cites the Island of Palmas Case, 2 U.N. Rep. Int.Arb. Awards 829 (1928), the Clipperton Island Award, 2
U.N. Rep. Int. Arb. Awards 1105 (1931), and the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
Case, 3 Hudson World Court Reports 148 (1938).
229. Deepsea Brief, supra note 34, at 207-09, citing Ghen v. Rich, 8 Fed. 159 (D.
Mass. 1881), and Swift v. Gifford, 2 Low. 110 (D. Mass. 1872).
230. Id. at 206.

[voL 19: 493, 1982]

Governing the Seabed
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

to draw lines on a map, unlike the wreck and whale cases where
the claimant identified a discrete wreck or a discrete whale.
Criteria for drawing those lines on a map cannot escape being
vague, arbitrary and subject to controversy. Goldie proposed in
1973, for example, that the claimed area should "provide an equitable return and no more."23 1 But each entity involved in seabed
mining has different financial arrangements; the requirements
that determine what "return" is "equitable" will vary
232
considerably.
The potential for international conflict is compounded by the
difficulty of determining when rights vest. If they vest when the
'T"st nodule"233 is taken by an enterprise planning to engage in
marine mining at some later date, then exclusive rights have already been established to all economically important nodule deposits.234 It would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine who
pulled up the first nodule from a particular area. If, on the other
hand, the area must be "actively worked,"23 5 how is this term to
be defined? Deepsea Ventures believed that its prospecting program entitled it to exclusive rights. If, however, actual commercial operations are required for the rights to vest, the purpose of
exclusive rights would be defeated, because miners seek security
prior to making the major investments needed to begin commercial production. 236 Disputes would also arise over when, if ever,
the exclusive rights lapse. For example, what degree of performance is required to maintain them?
VI. WOULD A "FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAs"/"REcIPRocATIG
STATES" REGIME BE STABLE, OR WOULD IT LEAD TO
SERIOUS CONFLICTS?

A. A "ReciprocatingStates" Regime
The practical inadequacies of a regime of the high seas to pro231. Goldie (1973), supra note 24, at 812.
232. Burton, supra note 24, at 1167.
233. Goldie (1979), supra note 24, at 174 n.3.
234. Extensive exploratory work has been done by commercial concerns from
the United States, Japan, France, and others. The first deepsea nodules were
taken by the HMS Challengerin 1873, and scientific research teams have explored
most of the oceans for nodules since then.
235. Goldie (1973), supra note 24, at 812.
236. Flipse, Dubs & Greenwald, supra note 70.

vide a sound legal basis for deep seabed mining have long been
recognized. Ely has pointed out some of the problems:
While it is natural that we look first to the law of the sea in constructing a
regime for the development of the minerals beneath the sea, we are nevertheless dealing here with fixed and firm real estate, not with the trackless
ocean. To make real estate valuable it must have ascertainable boundaries and be subject to clear and exclusive rights of occupancy. These are
just the reverse
of the attributes which make a sea lane valuable for
237
commerce.

The United States and other potential seabed mining nations
are nonetheless now tempted to begin seabed mining under a regime of the high seas and to provide the necessary mine site security through "reciprocating States" agreements. A country can
use its flag-State jurisdiction to forbid its own citizens from interfering with a miner which the country has licensed to use a particular site. By mutual agreement, countries can promise to
respect each other's claims and prevent their own citizens from
infringing upon the claims' of other countries which they have
agreed to recognize. Such reciprocating States agreements cannot operate to exclude miners from countries not participating in
the agreements; but if the major seabed mining nations are included in the agreements, a miner may feel sufficiently secure to
proceed with investments in particular sites.
The 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act provides
for such agreements in the interim before a law of the sea treaty
takes effect. 238 The possibility of using reciprocating States agreements as a permanent alternative to a comprehensive multilateral
treaty is undoubtedly being given serious consideration by the
United States government.
Assessing whether a reciprocating States regime could succeed,
should the UNCLOS Il negotiations fail, is necessarily a speculative enterprise. But "success" must be carefully defined. Success
from the perspective of seabed miners, adequate security to allow
them to secure the financing to proceed with their projects, must
be differentiated from the national and international interests in
avoiding conflicts and avoiding precedents that may lead to undesirable consequences in other parts of the oceans. The following
observations should serve as cautions to those who might prefer a
reciprocating States regime to a treaty.
B. "Poaching"Claimed Mine Sites
Only a few nations, those that intend to mine the seabed them237. Ely, The Laws Governing Exploitation of the MineralsBeneath the Sea, in
ExpLorriNG THE OCEAN 373, 378 (1966).
238. See Deep Seabed Act § 118, supra note 18.
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selves, will consider it worthwhile to brave the protests that are
bound to arise from the developing countries and the Eastern European countries over joining a reciprocating States regime. If all
nations that possess the practical capability to mine the seabed
join the agreement, miners may have the necessary security. But
at least two of the potential seabed mining nations, France2 3 9 and
Canada, have conflicting interests. They are major producers of
nickel from terrestrial deposits.

240

Seabed production could com-

pete with their nickel markets. As a result, their interests will not
be identical with those of the United States and other nickel
importers.
In addition, the United States and its close allies may not have
a permanent monopoly on seabed mining. If the Soviet Union
should begin seabed mining, it might not be possible to induce it
to join the reciprocating States agreement, especially if the best
241
sites had already been claimed.
Because some mine sites are much better than others 242 and
because the earliest miners are likely to find and exploit these
better sites, later entrants to seabed mining will have a strong incentive to try to "share" sites already claimed by others. Some
writers have argued that such "poaching" is unlikely, but their
conclusions were based on erroneous projects that hundreds of
equivalent mine sites existed. 24 3 If the later entrants are nations
not parties to the reciprocating States agreements, they will be
under no legal obligation to respect earlier claims. Should poaching ever occur, the nation originally claiming the site will undoubtedly feel intense political pressure from its miners to
defend its interests, despite any earlier disclaimers of exclusive
239. France has recently passed a law authorizing some seabed mining by its
citizens, requiring French companies to give 3.75 percent of the value of the exploited minerals to the developing countries. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1981, at A5,col.

5.
240. N. MATrHEws, NICKEL (1979). Canada is the world's largest nickel producer. French-held New Caledonia is also a major producer. Canada has been the
prime mover behind the limitation on seabed production in the draft treaty. Her-

man, The Niceties of Nickel-Canadaand the Production Ceiling Issue at the Law
of the Sea Conference, 6 SYRACUSE J.I r'I. L. &COM. 265 (1979).
241. So far, the Soviet Union apparently has not tried to develop a deep seabed

mining capability. See note 70 supra, for a discussion of the rate at which mine
sites might be utilized.
242. See note 70 supra.
243. See, e.g., IL EcKERT, THE ENxcLosuRE or OcEAN REsoUrcEs 251 (1979);
Saffo, supra note 24, at 517-18.

jurisdiction. The end result could be the transformation of a regime of reciprocal States agreements to a regime of claims to exclusive rights: the "race to grab and to hold"244 that the United
States has long sought to prevent.
C. Problem of CoordinatingNational Laws
A reciprocating States regime needs delicate coordination and
mutual restraint among its members in order to succeed. Because criteria for claiming a site are arbitrary, 245 nations will have
to make sure that their respective national laws closely resemble
each other, or else the nation with the easiest regulations will end
up holding claims to a disproportionate area. The United States is
already encountering difficulties of this kind in its negotiations on
interim reciprocal States agreements. The United States wants to
limit the mine site size under any one application to 80,000 square
kilometers in the exploration phase, and 40,000 square kilometers
during commercial exploitation, 246 but other nations want the size
limit to be "two, three, or four times" that size. 247 Because a single mine site could yield $10 billion worth of metals over its lifetime, 248 the incentives for expansive claims are very high.
The seabed mining consortia are multinational,249 so they are
likely to seek their permits from the nation with the most permissive regulations. Each nation, however, is likely to try to exercise
as much jurisdiction as possible over the mining companies. For
example, under the Deep Seabed Act, the United States requires
244. Address of President Lyndon Johnson, supra note 146.
245. See notes 221-36 and accompanying text supra. The reciprocating-states
system in the Deep Seabed Act, supra note 18, gives priority to the first claimant
of a particular area. The United States will not issue a license or permit to its citizens if it conflicts with a "license, permit, or equivalent authorization" of a reciprocating nation, § 118(b), and the reciprocating nation must give similar recognition
to United States permits and licenses, § 118(a) (2). The Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is empowered to recognize the reciprocating states if they regulate "in a manner compatible with that provided in
this Act and the regulations issued under this Act," § 118(a) (1), including the effective dates for exploration and commercial exploitation.
In addition to the size of an area that can be claimed, potential conflicts that
must be negotiated include the duration of permits, work requirements (the
United States requires "periodic reasonable expenditures" established by the Administrator in order for the licensee to retain its exploration license, § 108(b)), environmental regulations, and the transferability of licenses.
246. Deep Seabed Mining: Proposed Regulations, Department of Commerce, 46
Fed. Reg. 18448 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. Part 970.601).
247. Hearingon Deep Seabed Mining: ProposedRegulations, Honolulu, Hawaii,
April 24, 1981 (oral statement of Robert Knecht, Director, Office of Ocean Minerals
and Energy, Department of Commerce).
248. Based on ARTmm D. Lrr, INc., supra note 7, at 5 (using a 25-year lifetime for the mine site).
249. Id. at 16-29.

[VOL 19: 493, 1982]

Governing the Seabed
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

any seabed miner with significant American participation to get
its permits under the United States law.2 50 The United States
statute also requires that vessels used in seabed mining must be
documented under United States laws 251 and that processing
plants be built in the United States unless economically unfeasible.252 These impositions of American interests on multinational
enterprises have drawn protests from the Japanese and European
25 3
partners.
D. Creeping Coastal State Jurisdiction
The failure of UNCLOS III and the exploitation of the deep seabed through reciprocating States agreements could lead to new
national claims to extended jurisdiction in the oceans. Although
the concepts of the "common heritage" and the "freedom of the
seas" both forbid exclusive claims to the deep seabed,2 these
prohibitions have a serious weakness: no precise definition exists
255
delimiting the common heritage or high seas area.
The Draft Convention gives coastal States jurisdiction over the
economic resources of a broad zone of adjacent ocean and seabed.
All coastal nations, regardless of the configuration of the surrounding seabed, are given a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).256 In addition, coastal States are given
exclusive control of the mineral resources of the continental shelf,
broadly defined by geologic criteria257 to include virtually all the
250. The Act defines those who must get licenses and permits under its provisions quite broadly, including any corporation in which American citizens have
any influence which will "substantially affect the independent business behavior"
of the corporation. Deep Seabed Act, supra note 18, § 4(3).
251. Id. § 102.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House
Comm on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 295 (1979) (statement of the Council of European and Japanese National Shipowners'
Associations).
254. See notes 200-236 and accompanying text supra.
255. See note 89 supra for the uncertainties raised by the "exploitability," "adjacency," and 200-meter limits in the Convention on the Continental ShelL
256. Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 56-57. The coastal nation has the sole
right to use the living and nonliving economic resources of the exclusive economic
zone.
257. The Draft Convention defines the continental shelf of a nation as the submarine areas that are "the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer
edge of the continental margin .. ." id.art. 76(1), although in any case, the
coastal State gets 200 miles. The Draft Convention then specifies certain geological criteria for determining the edge of the continental margin. Even if the criteria

areas likely to contain mineral resources (such as petroleum) associated with the continental margin.2 58 Under the Draft Convention, continental shelf jurisdiction cannot exceed 350 nautical
miles from the baselines of the territorial sea, or 100 nautical
miles from the 2,500 meter isobath, even when the other geologi259
cal criteria are met.
In the absence of a comprehensive treaty, nations will surely
continue to claim the resources of the submarine areas adjacent
to their coastlines. The possibility that nations could take advantage of the ill-defined limits of the common heritage area and extend their jurisdiction to the deep seabed will be restrained to
some degree by the body of law holding that continental shelf jurisdiction is limited to the "natural prolongation" of the continental land mass. 260 For geological reasons, most economically
interesting polymetallic nodules lie outside the continental margin.2 6 1

In a polarized post-UNCLOS environment, however, where

the reciprocating States are seen to be making free use of the
deep seabed, such national claims may prove tempting to a few
countries.
One large, economically attractive area for nodule mining begins about 200 miles from Isla Clarion, an uninhabited island
claimed by Mexico, and stretches westward from Mexico for several hundred miles. 262 Suppose some other nations, on the basis
of geological criteria, are recognized to have exclusive jurisdiction
over their continental margins up to 400 miles from shore. Can
Mexico, without meeting geological criteria, assert jurisdiction
over the nodules in this area up to 400 miles from Isla Clarion,
claiming perhaps that the entire area is a "natural prolongation"
of a deposit beginning in the Mexican EEZ?263 What if Mexico ofare otherwise met, the coastal state's jurisdiction cannot extend beyond 350 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea, or 100 nautical miles from the
2500 meter isobath. Id. art. 76(5).
The coastal state is required to pay a proportion of its revenues from the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles to the International Seabed Authority. The
rate begins at 1%, increasing to 7% of the value of production in the twelfth year.
Id. art. 82.
258. Report of the Secretary-General Economic Significance, in Terms of Seabed Mineral Resources of the Various Limits Proposed for National Jurisdiction,
U.N. Doc. A/A.C.138/47 (1973).
259. Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 76(5).
260. See note 89 supra.

261. Frazer, supra note 7, at 103.
262. See J. FiZER &M. FIsx, supra note 7, at 69. This report, based on the
most extensive data in the public domain, identifies several broadly defined areas
where high quality polymetallic nodules have been found. All He near the Clarion
and Clipperton Fracture Zone, stretching from a few hundred miles off of Baja
California to about 1000 miles southeast of Hawaii.
263. The argument assumes, of course, that coastpl nations will have 200-mile
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fered to share revenues from the area with the international
community?
Undoubtedly, a strong argument could be made that Mexico's
claim would be unwarranted. 26 4 But at the same time, if the alternative to Mexico's control was the "free" use of the area by
wealthy nations, much of the developing world might applaud
Mexico's assertion of jurisdiction.
VII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The legal regime that governs seabed mining has been a matter
of great controversy in the United States and throughout the
world because vast and strategically significant mineral resources
are at stake. In an energy-short and tension-filled world, the
struggle for resources is a key to national survival.
Lawyers have dusted off old doctrines to try to fit this new resource into some previously developed legal category, but the
truth is that no settled international law existed on the resources
of the deep seabed prior to the mid-1960's because no one had the
capacity to exploit these resources. Some advocates have argued
that the polymetallic nodules should be viewed as a res nullius,
available to be claimed on a first come, first served basis. No
strong precedents exist for this argument, however, and no nation
has seriously pursued this approach.
The United States has argued in recent years that seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas, like navigation and fishing. This
argument has logical problems because the polymetallic nodules
are an exhaustible resource; unlike fishing and navigation, which
can be done by many nations at once, profitable seabed mining
sites are limited, and a claim by one nation will definitely diminish the resources available to others. The text and negotiating
history of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas do not provide
much support for the proposition that seabed mining was viewed
as a high seas freedom. This approach also has practical
problems because it would not give miners an exclusive right to
mine a specific part of the seabed.
resource zones like the exclusive economic zone even if the treaty does not come
into force.

264. The argument would be that it has become customary law that a nation
can claim only its continental margin-the geological "natural prolongation"--or a
resource zone that cannot exceed 200 miles.

Some advocates have argued that seabed mining is permitted
by international law simply because it is not specifically prohibited. This approach has sparse authority and ignores the interrelationship of legal rights.
Since the mid-1960's, the nations of the world have worked hard
to create a consensus on all questions affecting the ocean's resources. Although a final treaty on the law of the sea remains an
elusive goal, many principles have been agreed upon. In the area
of seabed mining, at least three principles have gained universal
acceptance:
1. The resources of the deep seabed are the common
heritage of humankind, and developing countries must
enjoy genuine benefits from seabed exploitation.
2. If a law of the sea treaty is completed, and if it is
"generally accepted," it will bind nonparties.
3. If a treaty is not completed, nations cannot claim the
exclusive use of seabed mine sites.
The United States passed a statute in 1980 to promote seabed
mining during the "interim" period prior to the completion of a
law of the sea treaty. This statute proposes a "reciprocating
States" regime whereby like-minded nations can agree to respect
the mining claims of the citizens of other reciprocating nations.
This approach may be tempting to the nations that currently have
the technology to mine the seabed, but they should be wary of
pursuing it because:
1. This regime may lead to "poaching" of mine sites and
could otherwise cause international conflict.
2. The "reciprocating" nations may not in fact be able to
coordinate their laws and the mining consortia may be
tempted to shop around for the least onerous national
regulations.
3. This approach may encourage coastal nations to extend their jurisdiction beyond the continental margin to
claim seabed areas with rich deposits of nodules.
In addition, the rejection of a global treaty approach in favor of a
reciprocating States regime of the technologically advanced Western nations would mean passing up a chance to try to create real
international cooperation. If we continue to thwart the success of
UNCLOS III, we will be turning our backs on the possibility of
building trust relationships through a new international organization that might be able to reduce world tension and increase our
long term prospects for peace.
All nations have agreed that the deep seabed is the common
heritage of humankind. Although the concept has its ambiguities,
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it does impose some legal duties. Nations are not free to do as
they please on the seabed; they are not free to pretend that the
"common heritage" is an empty phrase without meaning. They
are bound by the common heritage principle to provide meaningful sharing of the benefits of the seabed with other nations, particularly the developing nations.
In assessing the fairness of the seabed provisions of a law of the
sea treaty, United States decision-makers should look from the
perspective of the seabed as the common heritage of humankind.
A regime of the freedom of the seas seems to offer some advantages, but they are illusory. The freedom of the seas concept was
originally rejected as the basis for a permanent regime by the developed countries because it could not guarantee the exclusive
use of mine sites. That reason is still valid, but even more important, the quest for security of tenure in what began as a high seas
freedom could eventually lead to dangerous national claims in the
seabed.
To attempt to extend the freedoms of the seas to cover seabed
mining would confirm the criticism expressed by Rene-Jean
Depuy in 1974, that it is a doctrine that promotes inequality in the
world: "Freedom of the seas has been akin to 'Freedom of labour'
in the Industrial Europe of the 19th century: in effect the right of
the great was license, that of the poor was submission."2 65 Seabed mining under the freedom of the seas would bring the doctrine into disrepute even for those uses, such as navigation, for
which it was originally intended and for which it retains conceptual validity. The claim that seabed mining is a freedom of the
seas is a claim that a common resource, the seabed, can be used
in a way that enriches the wealthy nations and further impoverishes the poor ones.
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